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INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND BIOPROSPECTING: A MODEL
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Aman Gebru*
Society has long enjoyed the benefits of medical advances. In
numerous cases, the biotechnology and pharmaceutical
(biopharmaceutical) industries build on knowledge accumulated
over centuries by traditional communities. As in the case of aspirin
and morphine, the use of this knowledge has reduced the time and
cost it takes to develop new drugs. Despite the community’s
contribution, the law only provides rights to the person or firm that
produces a medical product or service at the end of the process of
discovery. Information about the knowledge that allowed these
medical advancements to develop rarely comes to the forefront, and
this creates tension between source communities and
pharmaceutical companies. The controversy surrounding the
involvement of Pfizer and Unilever in research into weight loss
products based on the Hoodia plant used by the San people of the
Kalahari Desert for centuries as an appetite suppressant is a prime
example of potential problems with the current system.1 The tension
that arises in this relationship is whether source communities have
any claim emanating from their input in the modern drug
development process.
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This article asks whether legal intervention is necessary to
regulate the relationship between the knowledge-holder
communities and users of traditional knowledge (“TK”)—the knowhow, skills, innovations, and practices of indigenous people and
local communities. Answering in the affirmative, this article then
addresses the question of what form of legal protection is justified.
After describing the key problem and situating TK within the public
goods literature in the first part, the second part of the article
examines four of the major channels through which the production
of knowledge goods is supported. These include public investment,
private investment, secrecy and group cooperation. Because these
channels have their own advantages and disadvantages, the article
argues that a combination of these frameworks is needed to respond
to the diverse interests of the multiple stakeholders involved. These
alternative frameworks should consider the full spectrum from a
simple right of attribution to a ‘communal right’ requiring prior
consent before TK is accessed. Part three then proceeds to outline
the nature and scope of a ‘communal bioprospecting right’ for
source communities. The bioprospecting right would be based on
the disclosure of TK in a publicly accessible or restricted database.
The article concludes by outlining what the nature and scope of TK
codification should be and considers some of the implications that
flow from the proposed model legal framework.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Biopharmaceutical firms involved in bioprospecting, which is
the process of using plant and animal species to develop new drugs,
often use the knowledge of indigenous people and local
communities2 to make the process more efficient. The input that
indigenous people and local communities provide to
biopharmaceutical firms is beneficial in reducing the time and cost
involved in modern drug development, at least in the initial stages
of the process. If a successful drug is developed, the inventors of the
drug are rewarded through patent rights that give the inventor a right

2

While the term “indigenous peoples” is used in the literature to refer generally
to native populations who live with settler communities, the term “local
communities” is used in reference to communities that reside in countries from
which colonizing powers have left, but in which the community continues to be
secluded from the mainstream society in that country.
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to exclude others from making and using the protected invention.3
The knowledge that indigenous peoples and local communities
developed over generations is considered to be part of the “public
domain” free of encumbrances. There is no legal requirement or
business practice in which attribution is given or benefits flow back
to the source communities. In response to this status quo, source
communities and governments of countries in which a significant
indigenous population resides are increasingly taking a protectionist
stance. The governments of Brazil, India, and China, for example,
have enacted laws restricting access to the genetic resources and
traditional knowledge within their borders.4 This creates a potential
risk in which the bioprospecting relationships cannot be sustained in
the long term. Biopharmaceutical firms involved in these
relationships face public relations crises when they are accused of
engaging in unfair practices. While some accusations may be
justified, some firms face these allegations because of the lack of
clarity in legal frameworks or the expectation of interested
shareholders. Compounding this problem, TK and genetic resources
on which it relies face an alarming rate of loss. Since the early 1990s,
there have been several domestic and global initiatives attempting
to encourage the conservation of biodiversity and traditional
knowledge.5
A previous publication6 has outlined these two problems and
examined the rationale for legal intervention. The publication
3

35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012) (noting that patent rights in the US grant the patentee
of a product the right to make, use, sell, offer for sale, and import the patented
product).
4
Thomas Cottier & Marion Panizzon, Legal Perspectives on Traditional
Knowledge: The Case for Intellectual Property Protection, in INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 757–76 (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome Reichman
eds., 2005) (outlining national legislations enacted to protect TK in India, Brazil,
Peru, the Philippines, and the Africa model legislation).
5
Charles McManis, Biodiversity, Biotechnology and Traditional Knowledge
Protection: Law, Science and Practice, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 5
(2007).
6
Aman Gebru, International Intellectual Property Law and the Protection of
Traditional Knowledge: From Cultural Conservation to Knowledge Codification,
15 ASPER REV. INT’L BUS. TRADE L. 293 (2015).
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concludes by noting that the codification and disclosure of TK
should be a key rationale for legal intervention. This article builds
on the discussion by outlining a model legal framework based on
property rights that balances the interests of source communities and
has the potential to facilitate bioprospecting partnerships. Part I
starts with the Hoodia story to help introduce the issues that might
arise in bioprospecting projects. It summarizes research showing the
value of TK and the alarming rate at which the knowledge is
disappearing. The section concludes by situating TK within the
public goods literature and describing the problem from a welfare
economics perspective. Part II outlines four major alternative
channels that support the production of knowledge goods and
examines the potential and limitation of each channel to encourage
investments in TK. It analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of
government provision, private rights, secrecy, and group
cooperation in encouraging source communities to invest in
codifying their knowledge and disclosing it to outsiders. Because of
the diverse worldviews and interests among stakeholders, the article
advocates for the combination of these frameworks to govern
bioprospecting relationships.
Since the recognition of private rights plays such a major role in
the governance of modern knowledge, Part III of the article outlines
a detailed model legal framework based on a “communal
bioprospecting right.” The purpose of granting the bioprospecting
right is to address the key “tragedies” outlined in the article—the
TK loss and the rising protectionist trend. The right can be expected
to encourage investments in the codification and disclosure of TK
thereby saving the knowledge from loss. This “incentive to codify”7
rationale has two sides: the supply side and the demand side. On the
supply side, the regime encourages knowledge-holder communities
to codify and disclose their knowledge. On the demand side, it
encourages entrepreneurs who want to help knowledge-holder
communities in codifying and disclosing their knowledge to invest
in that process. Economic efficiency would require the granting of
rights so long as it is efficient and necessary to meet these purposes.

7

Id.
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The right would arise out of two types of databases in which
source communities codify their TK: a publicly accessible database
and a restricted database. A publicly accessible database would give
source communities one of two alternative rights: an exclusive
bioprospecting right or a right to share profits arising out of the use
of their TK. A restricted database, the contents of which are kept
confidential, would give source communities a right against
unauthorized access. Part III concludes by proposing factors that
should be considered in setting the breadth and term of the
bioprospecting right. Parts IV to VI examine the nature and scope of
TK codification and its implications for the different stakeholders
involved. The article suggests the adoption of a holistic codification
reflecting the availability of resources which will increase the value
of codified TK for both the firms and source communities.
A. The Hoodia Story8
The San people, a community featured in the 1984 hit film “The
Gods Must Be Crazy,” are a group of hunter communities around
the Kalahari Desert in southern Africa.9 The San people chew on
parts of the Hoodia plant to help them suppress their appetite when
they go on long hunting trips.10 While the San people and other
neighboring communities have been using the Hoodia plant as an
appetite suppressant for at least a couple hundred years, its use was
not studied scientifically in detail until the 1980s when the Center
for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), an agency of the
South African government, began a project to study the plant.11 After
decades of study and several trials, the center was able to isolate the
active ingredient responsible for appetite suppression and named the
compound P57.12 In 1995, CSIR was granted its first patent in South
Africa for the appetite suppressant qualities of the active elements

8

For a detailed discussion of five of the most famous cases of the use of
traditional medicinal knowledge in modern drug discovery, including the use of
the Hoodia plant, see generally OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1.
9
Id. at 167.
10
Id.
11
See id. at 168, 170.
12
See id. at 187–88.
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extracted from the Hoodia plant.13 Patent grants from other
jurisdictions soon followed, including in the US and EU.14 In
exchange for payment, CSIR entered into licensing agreements with
private companies including Phytopharm, Pfizer, and Unilever.15
These firms invested millions of dollars in research and
development for a weight loss product from the Hoodia extract.16
When the public heard news of the Hoodia extract patent,
activists, academics, and non-governmental organizations began
advocating for the sharing of profits related to P57 with the San
people. In response, the South African San Council and the Working
Group of Indigenous Minorities in South Africa (WIMSA)
established a jointly managed trust where some funds from the sale
of Hoodia plant would be deposited.17 WIMSA thereafter brought
legal action against CSIR, and, in a settlement agreement, CSIR
agreed to pay 8% of milestone payments and 6% of the royalty
payments from P57 into the trust.18 In May 2005, CSIR paid
R560,000 South African Rand into the trust, which they planned to
spend on education and other projects that would create jobs for the
San people.19
While the San people were hoping to share profits from P57, the
marketing process hit a roadblock.20 Producing a marketable product
from the Hoodia extract proved much more challenging than
anticipated.21 Pfizer terminated its license in 2003 because of the
13

Rachel Wynberg, Case Study 7: Access and Benefit-Sharing Agreements in
the Commercial Development of Hoodia, in CBD TECHNICAL SERIES NO. 38:
ACCESS AND BENEFIT-SHARING IN PRACTICE: TRENDS IN PARTNERSHIPS ACROSS
SECTORS 83, https://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-38-en.pdf; see also
South African Patent No. 983170.
14
WIPO,
CASE
STUDY:
HOODIA
PLANT
(2008),
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/academy/en/about/global_network/educa
tional_materials/cs1_hoodia.pdf; see also Int’l Patents Nos. US6376657,
GB2338235, and WO9846243
15
WIPO, supra note 14, at 2–3.
16
See OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1, at 189; WIPO, supra note 14, at 2.
17
OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1, at 191.
18
OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1, at 192; WIPO, supra note 14.
19
OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1, at 192. In current currency exchange, R560,000
South African rand would be approximately $ 42,218 USD.
20
See OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1, at 189.
21
See id. at 189–90.
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challenges and high cost associated with synthesizing and extracting
P57.22 In 2008, Unilever ended its license because of adverse side
effects of the compound.23 CSIR, however, continues to conduct
research on the Hoodia plant, and now Hoodia-based products have
become ubiquitous in the dietary supplement market.24
The Hoodia story shows the relationship between the various
stakeholders in the use of TK, the complexities of using this
knowledge in the drug discovery process, and potential solutions.
Before analyzing these issues, however, it seems necessary to first
define the term “traditional knowledge.”
B. Defining Traditional Knowledge25
Scholars have yet to agree on a universally accepted definition
of TK.26 However, there is sizable literature on its value, protection,
and conservation.27 The term traditional knowledge is given narrow

22

Wynberg, supra note 13, at 83.
OSSEO-ASARE, supra note 1, at 189.
24
WIPO, supra note 14.
25
Although defining the key and complex terms in this paper is necessary to
provide a coherent and detailed analysis, it should be noted that the practice of
defining terms such as “traditional knowledge,” “indigenous peoples,” and “local
communities” is highly controversial. Some indigenous peoples and local
communities find the process of defining these terms as part of a bigger problem
of disempowerment, especially when the definition dissects concepts and values
they consider to be holistic. See WIPO, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL.
PROP. AND GENETIC RES., TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE,
WIPO/GRTKF/IC/17/INF/9, LIST AND BRIEF TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF
VARIOUS FORMS IN WHICH TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE MAY BE FOUND (2010),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/sct/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_17/wipo_grtkf_ic_17_in
f_9.pdf; see also Maeli Astruc, Indigenous Peoples Present Their Perspectives on
Traditional Knowledge at WIPO, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Mar. 25, 2014),
https://www.ip-watch.org/2014/03/25/indigenous-peoples-present-theirperspectives-on-traditional-knowledge-at-wipo/.
26
See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. &
GENETIC RES. TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/4/8
ELEMENTS OF A SUI GENERIS SYSTEM OF PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE,
(2002).
27
See generally PETER DRAHOS & SUSY FRANKEL, INDIGENOUS PEOPLE’S
INNOVATION: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PATHWAYS TO DEVELOPMENT (2012);
CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE:
23
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(sensu stricto) and broad (sensu lato) scopes in the relevant
literature.28 In its narrow sense, the term refers to the know-how,
skills, innovations, and practices of indigenous peoples and local
communities.29 The broader definition of the term includes
traditional “know-how,” but it also extends to cultural expressions
such as folklore, music, dances, and artistic creations.30 This article
adopts the narrower version of the term because a narrow definition
allows for a detailed and coherent analysis and because it is the most
frequently used definition in literature.31 Therefore, for the purposes
of this article, the term TK refers to the know-how, skills, practices,
innovations, and learnings of indigenous peoples and local
communities. It should be stressed, however, that the definition of
the term TK is highly contentious, with multiple approaches being
adopted by source communities and scholars working in the field.32
It must be noted at the outset that the term “traditional” is not used
to connote its antiquity.33 Instead, “traditional” refers to the way the
knowledge is developed, used, and shared.34 While modern

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, PLANT BIODIVERSITY, AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE
(2006).
28
See OGUAMANAM, supra note 27, at 21.
29
WIPO, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. AND GENETIC RES.,
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/9, TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE: OPERATIONAL TERMS AND DEFINITIONS, Annex III at 5,
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_3/wipo_grtkf_ic_3_9.pdf.
30
Id.
31
Jerome H. Reichman & Tracy Lewis, Using Liability Rules to Stimulate
Local Innovation in Developing Countries: Application to Traditional
Knowledge, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY
UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME (Keith E. Maskus &
Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005).
32
For a list of definitions adopted by scholars, see WIPO, supra note 25.
33
Nuno Pires de Carvalho, From the Shaman’s Hut to the Patent Office: A Road
Under Construction, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
BIOTECHNOLOGY AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 244 (2007).
34
See Antony Taubman, Saving the Village: Conserving Jurisprudential
Diversity in the International Protection of Traditional Knowledge, in
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A
GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME 521, 524 (Jerome Reichman &
Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005).
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knowledge uses evidence-based investigation, TK is characterized
by trial-and-error methodologies and intuition.35
A variety of adjectives are frequently appended to “knowledge”
in this context, including “indigenous,” “traditional,”
“native/aboriginal,” “local,” and “informal.”36 The term “indigenous
people” refers to people (including their descendants) who were
colonized by European powers in countries where the colonizing
population remains the dominant group.37 While some scholars limit
their definition only to the knowledge of indigenous peoples, others
argue that the term should be expanded to include local
communities. For instance, Chidi Oguamanam argues that because
of the many similarities between the knowledge that indigenous
peoples and local communities hold, the term should include
knowledge held by communities in Africa and Asia that have seen
the withdrawal of colonial powers.38 In this sense, TK would refer
to the know-how, skills, practices, and innovations of “indigenous
peoples . . . and . . . to members of the so-called local communities
or non-Western cultures, be they indigenous in the strict sense or
not.”39
“Indigenous knowledge” and “knowledge of local
communities” share common features relevant for the discussions in
this article, and, therefore, in this article, the term TK is used to refer
to the know-how, skills, practices, and innovations of both
35

The trial-and-error approach, as opposed to a formalistic and technical
approach, is one in which the traditional knowledge or wisdom is slowly
developed through the experiences of generations of community members.
Although each community has its own way of building on the knowledge that is
passed down from elders, some of the common mechanisms include through
stories and songs that communicate the ways in which resources in the
surrounding environment could be used for food, health needs, shelter, navigation
etc. See Carvalho, supra note 33, at 244 (listing the four elements of TK including
the fact that it based on “trial-and-error” approach); Reichman, supra note 31, at
356.
36
OGUAMANAM, supra note 27.
37
Stephen R. Munzer & Kal Raustiala, The Uneasy Case for Intellectual
Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge, 27 CARDOZO ARTS ENTERTAIN. L.J.
37, 48 n.25 (2009).
38
OGUAMANAM, supra note 27, at 22.
39
Id. at 20–26.
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indigenous peoples and local communities. Thus, the focus is on the
isolation of communities from mainstream societies. The term
“users,” on the other hand, refers to diverse groups of individuals or
firms with differing backgrounds and interests (commercial or noncommercial) that use TK to further their goals.
In the face of this complex group of stakeholders, it is helpful to
clarify the focus of this article. The literature on the protection of
TK uses the term “protection” in two ways: defensive and positive.
Defensive protection seeks to stop non-indigenous people from
claiming intellectual property (IP) rights40 over TK.41 For instance,
traditional medicinal knowledge (TMK) could be used to invalidate
non-innovative patents through disclosure of the TMK to patent
examiners.42 Most attempts at defensive protection are not
contentious as they seek to improve the existing IP system. The
other mode of TK protection—positive protection—is more
controversial, as it aims to provide knowledge-holding communities
with the power to control how their knowledge is used by
outsiders.43 This article will focus on the positive mode of
protection.
C. The Value of Traditional Knowledge
TK may be useful in two ways: first, as an independent body of
knowledge that indigenous and local communities use, and second,
40

The term “intellectual property rights” here refers to the rights that are
granted over scientific, literary, and artistic creations that are the subject matters
of patents, copyrights and trademark rights.
41
WIPO, INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMM. ON INTELL. PROP. AND GENETIC RES.,
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE AND FOLKLORE, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/6/8, DEFENSIVE
PROTECTION MEASURES RELATING TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, GENETIC
RESOURCES AND TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: AN UPDATE (2003),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_grtkf_ic_6/wipo_grtkf_ic_6_8.pdf.
42
The Traditional Knowledge Digital Library, which has documented thousands of
Indian TMK, has been used by patent offices around the world to invalidate noninnovative patents. See TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE DIGITAL LIBRARY ("TKDL"),
http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/common/Home.asp?GL=Eng (last visited Oct.
29, 2017).
43
VERA SHRIVASTAV, PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE WITHIN THE
EXISTING FRAMEWORK OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: DEFENSIVE AND
POSITIVE APPROACH
(July 7,
2014)
(unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2463017.

268

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 19: 257

as an input for the production of goods and services in modern
industries. This article is concerned with the use of TK as an input
in modern industries. One of the best examples of this type of value
is the use of TMK in the modern drug discovery process. Thus,
TMK will be used as an example throughout this article.
Various sources have examined the role TMK plays in modern
medicine. For instance, one study revealed that in the context of
plant screenings, the use of TMK increased the chances of getting a
preliminary hit44 from 6% (without the use of TMK) to 25% (with
the use of TMK).45 This means that in the initial stages of research,
scientists would have a considerably higher chance of selecting a
compound with an active ingredient from a collection of plants.
Other research has revealed the predictive role that TMK plays in
drug discovery.46 In one study, 80% of the drugs tested were used
to treat the same ailments in both modern and traditional medicine.47
These statistics, however, do not mean that 80% of drugs are derived
from TMK. Although challenged by some, the value of TMK in
modern drug discovery has repeatedly been demonstrated. The
information provided through TMK would complement the
scientific process at least in the sample selection stages. For
instance, TMK has played a significant role in the attempt to find a
cure for AIDS:
44

“Preliminary hit” is the compound that is selected from a large number of
compounds because of either its phenotype or process which is relevant for the
disease being researched. The compound would still have to go through validation
and other tests in the drug discovery process. See Benoit Deprez & Rebecca
Deprez-Poulain, Hit-to-Lead: Driving Forces for the Medicinal Chemist, 4 CURR.
TOP. MED. CHEM. i, i (2004); Rebecca Deprez-Poulain & Benoit Deprez, Facts,
Figures and Trends in Lead Generation, 4 CURR. TOP. MED. CHEM. 569–80
(2004).
45
Michael Balick, Ethnobotany and the Identification of Therapeutic Agents
from the Rainforest, in BIOACTIVE COMPOUNDS FROM PLANTS 22, 28 (D. J.
Chadwick & J. Marsh eds., 1990).
46
See C. Haris Saslis-Lagoudakis et al., Phylogenies Reveal Predictive Power
of Traditional Medicine in Bioprospecting, 109 PROC. NATL. ACAD. SCI. 15835–
40 (2012).
47
Daniel S. Fabricant & Norman R. Farnsworth, The Value of Plants Used in
Traditional Medicine for Drug Discovery, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP., 69, 71–
72 (2001), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1240543/.
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In a field study in the rain forest in Belize, Dr. [Michael] Balick [director
of the Institute of Economic Botany at the New York Botanical Garden]
compared using a random collection of plant species with an
ethnobotanical approach, in which only the plants that local people say
have medical uses are collected. [ . . . ]
Of the 20 plants collected on the shaman’s advice, five killed the AIDS
virus but spared the T cells. But of 18 plant species gathered randomly,
just one did so.48

The implication is that consulting a shaman increases the
chances of a scientist producing a cure from 5.56% to 25%.
Although much more research and development may be required to
enhance TMK beyond its traditional use, the role TMK plays is
crucial. Similarly, one can imagine that other types of TK, such as
traditional agricultural knowledge (“TAK”) and traditional
environmental knowledge (“TEK”), would have significant value as
input in modern research.
D. The Tragedy of Traditional Knowledge
Although TK holds considerable value, the body of knowledge
is diminishing rapidly. Anthropologists and other researchers have
been sounding the alarm on the distressing rate of TK loss. “For
instance, research by Victoria Reyes-García and her colleagues has
revealed that between the years 2000–2009, the loss of TK related
to the use of plants among Tsimane` Amerindians (an Amazonian
community) ranged ‘from 9% (for the female subsample) to 26%
(for the subsample of people living close to towns).’49 The
researchers identified that TK loss is higher in communities living
close to cities than those in remote villages.”50 The increasing
urbanization of rural communities spurred by globalization can only
be expected to increase the rate of TK loss. TMK especially seems
48

Daniel Goleman, Shamans and Their Lore May Vanish with Forests, N.Y.
TIMES (June 11, 1991), http://www.nytimes.com/1991/06/11/science/shamansand-their-lore-may-vanish-with-forests.html.
49
Victoria Reyes-García et al., Evidence of Traditional Knowledge Loss Among
a Contemporary Indigenous Society, 34 EVOL. HUM. BEHAV. 249, 249 (2013),
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3837211/.
50
Aman Gebru, The Global Protection of Traditional Knowledge: Searching
for the Minimum Consensus, 17 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 42, 44-45
(2017); id. at 252.
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to be facing a high rate of loss. Dr. Mark Plotkin, an ethno-botanist
at Conservation International, worries that knowledge of how to use
medicinal plants may be disappearing, stating “[w]e often talk about
disappearing species, but the knowledge of how to use these species
is disappearing much faster than the species themselves . . . [t]he
knowledge that’s being lost most rapidly is information on healing
plants.”51
Several factors contribute to this dramatic rate of TK loss,
including socio-economic and environmental pressures. 52 For
example, the environmental pressures that destroy the biodiversity
resources that certain indigenous peoples rely on for survival will
inevitably increase the rate of loss of the knowledge associated with
such biodiversity. Similarly, political ostracism and denial of access
to traditional lands will also add to the alarming rate of TK loss.
Consequently, a multi-pronged approach is necessary to address the
problem of TK loss.
This article, however, will focus on two problems that add to the
rate of TK loss: first, the predominance of oral transmission of TK
among indigenous peoples and local communities, and second, the
rising protectionist trend in which source communities are
increasingly restricting access to TK in response to the absence of
legal and practical control mechanisms. Although multiple factors
drive TK loss, it seems that the combination of lack of codification
and a rising protectionist trend plays a unique role.
1.

Predominance of Oral Transmission
One of the core features of TK is that it is orally transmitted from
one generation to the next through kinship and personal
relationships.53 This is not to say, however, that there is no codified
TK: South Asian TMK such as Ayurveda and Unani are good

51

Goleman, supra note 48.
See Reyes-García et al, supra note 49, at 255.
53
John K. Githae, Potential of TK for Conventional Therapy: Prospects and
Limits, in GENETIC RESOURCES, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE, AND THE LAW:
SOLUTIONS FOR ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING 77, 78 (Evanson C. Kamau &
Winter Gerd eds., 2009).
52
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examples of documented TK.54 However, systematically codified
TMK seems to be the exception rather than the rule. The
transmission of TK, and more particularly TMK, is usually made
through kinship relationships and cultural initiations.55
The oral nature of TK lies in stark contrast to modern knowledge
in which a culture of systematic documentation and dissemination
is the norm.56 This culture of documentation is observable in various
aspects of modern communities. For instance, in the academic
setting, which is one of the core channels of knowledge production
and dissemination, “publish or perish” has been the custom since at
least the early 20th century,57 highlighting the pressure on researchers
to externalize their knowledge for disclosure and wide
dissemination. Intellectual property laws—which function as the
main legal tools for regulating the production, use, and
dissemination of inventive knowledge goods—are filled with
documentation requirements.58 Examples include the disclosure
requirement59 under patent laws and the copyright law requirement
that expressions be fixed in a tangible medium.60 The absence of a
similar culture of codifying knowledge among indigenous peoples
and local communities plays a key part in increasing the rate of TK
loss. While the knowledge of modern societies continues to exist
through books and other mediums of documentation, a considerable
portion of indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ knowledge
disappears with the communities.

54

See WIPO, Inventory of Existing Online Databases Containing Traditional
Knowledge Documentation Data, at 6, WIPO/GRTKF/IC/3/6, (May 10, 2002).
55
See Carvalho, supra note 33, at 244.
56
OGUAMANAM, supra note 27, at 14.
57
See generally Lindley J. Stiles, Publish-or-Perish Policies in Perspective,
XVII J. TEACH. EDUC. 464 (1966).
58
Documentation plays a key role in patent and trademark rights, and
documentation of literary and artistic works provides the copyright owner with
stronger claims. See 17 U.S.C. § 401 et. seq. (2012).
59
35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012).
60
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
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2.

A Rising Protectionist Trend
Exacerbating the problem of TK loss is a rising protectionist
trend in which source communities and megadiverse countries61 take
measures to restrict access to TK and genetic resources. This trend
seems to have been a response to the lack of effective legal
protection for TK and genetic resources. A few scholars have
noted,62 albeit in passing, that there has been an increase in domestic
legislation restricting access to TK and genetic resources in
megadiverse countries. Biodiversity-rich countries of the Global
South and many knowledge-holder communities see the lack of
legal protection as unfair. The protectionist trend adds to the
alarming rate of TK loss resulting from the predominantly
uncodified nature of TK.
This protectionist trend should be worrying because increased
access to TK and genetic resources, not increased restriction, is
beneficial to collaboration and innovation in the bioprospecting
field. Increased access is what close to two hundred countries of the
world agreed to when they signed the Convention on Biodiversity
(CBD). However, recent trends seem to show a disturbing trend
towards increasing restrictions. As Charles McManis observes, the
CBD
[s]timulated a wave of national legislation having the effect (whether
intended or unintended) of restricting, rather than facilitating, access to
genetic resources in the developing world, pending the industrialized
world’s adoption of a meaningful benefit-sharing measure.63

Restrictions on genetic resources would mean restricted access
to TK because of TK’s close linkage to genetic resources, and most
national legislative acts also mention restrictions on access to TK
61

“Megadiversity” refers to the state of a locality in which it is host to a
disproportionately high level of biological diversity. The uniqueness of a species
to a certain country—endemism—is at the heart of the method used in
determining which countries are megadiverse. Mega-diverse countries make up
close to 70% of the biodiversity in the world. Megadiverse Countries, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.biodiversitya-z.org/content/megadiverse-countries (last
visited Nov. 5, 2017).
62
See Carvalho supra note 33; Cottier & Panizzon, supra note 4, at 757–76
(outlining national legislations enacted to protect TK in India, Brazil, Peru, the
Philippines, and the Africa model legislation.).
63
McManis, supra note 5, at 5.
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concurrently. The status quo in bioprospecting relationships will not
be sustainable if this trend continues and more megadiverse
countries legislate to restrict access.
In addition to national restrictions, there are some attempts by
indigenous and local communities to keep TK secret. For example,
the various religious or cultural ceremonies by shamans that hold
traditional medicinal knowledge are effective in concealing the
knowledge from members of their own indigenous and local
communities. These attempts may have limited effect in keeping a
given medicinal plant and medicinal knowledge secret from a
trained scientist who has the knowledge and skill to identify and
investigate therapeutic plants. Although some of these attempts to
keep TK secret fail, other measures may be created that will become
effective in restricting access. If governments and communities in
megadiverse countries are determined to limit access to TK, they
could do so by putting restrictions on traveling to such sites. Some
communities successfully keep their knowledge secret through
geographic and social barriers.64
The fact that megadiverse countries take a protectionist stance
on genetic resources and TK may not necessarily be troublesome. If
such measures were effective in allowing either the source countries
or communities to use the knowledge in producing products and
services for the public, such an approach would have functioned
similarly to trade secrets in modern industries. However, source
countries and communities do not have the capacity to use TK in
such a way, and such uses of TK have not been reported to date.
Additionally, there is a real risk that TK held in secret might be lost
before it is transmitted or used because of the lack of TK
codification. In those instances, both the TK holders and the public
lose. In the absence of use, codification, or disclosure, this
knowledge base will be lost to the communities and cultures that
preserved it for ages.

64

Doris Estelle Long, Trade Secrets and Traditional Knowledge:
Strengthening International Protection of Indigenous Innovation, in THE LAW
AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH
495 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandberg eds. 2011).
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In summary, the lack of systematic documentation among many
knowledge-holder communities contributes significantly to the
tragedy that TK faces, especially when combined with the
protectionist trend, and other factors such as the continued
destruction of knowledge-holder communities and their biodiversity
resources. This lack of investment in the codification of TK, despite
its considerable value, may seem paradoxical. This is made even
more complex by the rising protectionist trend. From the perspective
of global public welfare, more access to TK and genetic resources is
better rather than increased restrictions. The section below frames
these issues within public goods literature to better understand the
problem of TK loss and rising protectionism, and to find potential
solutions.
E. Traditional Knowledge as a “Public Good”
Public goods in economic literature are non-rivalrous (i.e.,
goods that could be consumed by one person without reducing the
ability of another to consume the same good) and non-excludable
(i.e., goods from which the producer cannot extract benefits).65
Knowledge is commonly considered to be a public good and is at
times labeled “the quintessential public good.”66 For decades,
economists have noted the public-good nature of knowledge.67
Sharing one’s knowledge with another does not lessen the amount
of knowledge consumed by each person, and once knowledge is
disclosed to the public, it is usually difficult, costly, or impossible
65

See generally HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS (3rd ed. 1992).
Peter Drahos, The Regulation of Public Goods, in INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
GOODS AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY REGIME 46, 47 (Jerome Reichman & Keith E. Maskus eds., 2005).
67
See, e.g., Joseph H. Vogel, From ‘the Tragedy of the Commons’ to the
‘Tragedy of the Common Place’: Analysis and Synthesis Through the Lens of
Economic Theory, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY,
BIOTECHNOLOGY, & TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE (Charles McManis ed., 2007);
RAYMOND G. BATINA & TOSHIHIRO IHORI, PUBLIC GOODS: THEORIES AND
EVIDENCE 2 (2005), http://link.library.utoronto.ca/eir/EIRdetail.cfm?Resources
__ID=444946&T=F (last visited Nov 27, 2014); Joseph Stiglitz, Knowledge as a
Global Public Good, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
IN THE 21ST CENTURY (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, & Mark A. Stern eds.,
1999).
66
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to exclude those who do not pay from accessing the knowledge. The
public-good nature of knowledge is, for instance, one of the core
rationales behind the granting of intellectual property rights over
certain inventions and expressions.68
As defined in the introductory section, TK refers to the knowhow, skills, and practices of indigenous and local communities.69
Like other information goods, TK could be enjoyed simultaneously
by different parties, and once disclosed to outsiders, it would be
impossible to exclude them because it is a public good with nonrivalrous and non-excludable features. Because of its public-good
nature, TK faces risks similar to those facing other information
goods: most relevant, a risk of market failure caused by the reduced
capacity of the “producer” to appropriate the benefits of the good
(the inappropriability problem). While one could help prevent the
loss of TK by investing in its codification and disclosure, once the
knowledge is disclosed the investor would not have the ability to
distinguish those who pay to use the knowledge from those who
access it without authorization.
While government intervention is sometimes required to address
inappropriability problems with public goods and produce such
goods at optimal levels, there are times in which public goods are
produced (sometimes at optimal levels) despite being nonexcludable.70 The following section discusses the potential and
limitation of some common channels for the production of modern
knowledge71 to incentivize investments in the codification and
disclosure of TK. “Investment in the production of a good” in public
68
While there are several alternative ways of encouraging investments in the
production of public goods, intellectual property rights are one of the key channels
through which knowledge production is encouraged. See Mark A. Lemley, Ex
Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 UNIV. CHI. L. REV.
129, 129 (2004).
69
See supra Section I.B.
70
See Varian, supra note 65, at 414–15.
71
Although there is no clear and distinct way to define “modern” knowledge,
the paper is using these terms to refer to know-how that does not fit in the
definition of TK outlined under section I.B above. In this sense, “modern”
knowledge would refer to know-how that is in the mainstream system of modern
knowledge governance defined by systemic inquiry and extensive documentation.
The terms “modern” and “Western” are used interchangeably in the literature.
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goods literature is referred to in this article as investing in the
“codification and disclosure of TK.”
II.

ALTERNATIVE CHANNELS FOR ENCOURAGING
INVESTMENT IN TK
Knowledge goods in the modern world have been produced
through different channels. These channels include government
investment/subsidy, recognition of private rights, secrecy, and
group cooperation.72 While there are other channels that support the
production of knowledge goods, these four channels are the most
relevant for the production of knowledge goods in general and TK
in particular.
A. Government Provision
Government provision is a major channel for the production of
knowledge goods. A considerable portion of knowledge production
in universities, government agencies, and research institutes is
publicly funded and contributes significantly to socio-economic
development.73 Government investment in infrastructure for the
production of knowledge goods is essential to sustain modern
knowledge.74 Similarly, government supply or subsidy may be
necessary for the codification and disclosure of TK; the TK
codification attempts initiated by governments in some countries are
good examples of this need. The governments of India,75 China,76
72

See generally Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the
Patents-Prizes Debate, 92 TEXAS L. REV. 303 (2013).
73
Additionally, governments set up prize systems in which quality research and
publication is rewarded through a competitive process. Researchers, with the hope
of receiving the financial reward and social recognition that comes with winning
the prize, may be willing to invest their resources in addressing such problems.
Some government funds have eligibility requirements that are used to direct
research into areas of special public interest. See Marlynn Wei, Should Prizes
Replace Patents - A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, 13 B.U.
J. SCI. TECH. L. 25, 25–26 (2007).
74
See Stiglitz, supra note 67, at 311.
75
See TKDL, supra note 42.
76
See Yanling Sun, Introduction to China TCM Patent Database, STATE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE (June 17, 2002), http://www.wipo.int/export/
sites/www/tk/en/resources/pdf/china.pdf.
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South Korea,77 South Africa,78 and Venezuela79 have invested
considerable financial and human resources to collect, organize,
document, and manage TK within their jurisdictions.
Despite the potential of government investment/subsidy in
supporting the codification of TK, there are issues that could limit
this potential.80 One major limitation is the fact that TK is a global
public good that crosses borders easily. Knowledge that is supplied
or subsidized by one government could be used by entities outside
that country. Without a global system that recognizes such
contributions, the producing country may be unable to control the
uses of such knowledge.81 This scenario would involve a free-rider
problem which could in-turn reduce the incentives of governments
to invest in TK codification and disclosure. Discussing “modern”
knowledge production in general, the Nobel Prize-winning
economist Joseph Stiglitz rightly argues that the global free-rider
problem (in which some countries will try to benefit by taking from
77

See Jeongyoon Choi, Introduction of Korean Traditional Knowledge Portal
(KTKP), KOREAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE (Mar. 2011),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_tkdl_del_11/wipo_tkdl_del_11_re
f_t9_4.pdf.
78
Biffy van Rooyen, Safeguarding the Future of Indigenous Knowledge
Through ICT, 5 SCIENCESCOPE 24, 25 (2011); Catherine Saez, South Africa to
Launch National Traditional Knowledge Recording System, INTELL. PROP.
WATCH (Oct. 5, 2013), http://www.ip-watch.org/2013/05/10/south-africa-tolaunch-national-traditional-knowledge-recordingsystem/?utm_source=weekly&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=alerts.
79
WIPO, supra note 54; Stanford Zent & Eglee L. Zent, On Biocultural
Diversity from a Venezuelan Perspective: Tracing the Interrelationships Among
Biodiversity, Culture Change and Legal Reform, in BIODIVERSITY AND THE LAW:
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, BIOTECHNOLOGY, & TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE 91,
105 (Charles R. McManis ed., 2007).
80
Government investment in the provision of TK may include investments in
infrastructure or in investing in the codification of TK itself. See TKDL, supra
note 42; Sun, supra note 76; Choi, supra note 77.
81
In fact, developing countries pushed for the signing of the Nagoya Protocol
because they were unable to enforce access and benefit sharing requirements set
out in their law against users in developed countries. See Linda Wallbott,
Franziska Wolff, & Justyna Pozarowska, The Negotiations of the Nagoya
Protocol: Issues, Coalitions and Process, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF GENETIC
RESOURCES: ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING AFTER THE NAGOYA PROTOCOL 33,
41–52 (Sebastian Oberthür & G. Kristin Rosendal eds., 2014).
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the global pool of knowledge, without contributing their share to it)
is cause for concern.82 He states that this free-rider problem might
limit the initiative of some governments to fund global public goods,
and posits that the establishment of a global entity that would
manage investments in the production of knowledge might help
optimize investments in global knowledge generation.83
This global free-rider problem is particularly stark in the case of
TK and genetic resources. While most TK and biodiversity
resources are found in the global South, users of such knowledge are
predominantly based in the global North where the necessary
technological advancement and skill is found.84 Therefore, an
investment by countries in the South for the codification of TK will
face a significant free-rider problem because firms residing in
countries of the North will be able to benefit from such codification
without sharing the cost. In fact, the risk of free riders seems to be
behind the restrictive measures taken by the TK codification
initiatives in the TK source countries, noted earlier, whose projects
are oriented towards defensive protection (i.e., using the contents of
the databases to stop others from claiming patent rights based on
such knowledge).85 Access to such databases is provided in a highly
restricted manner to patent examiners for the sole purpose of patent
examinations.86 Even if there are “open” databases, they are limited
to local uses within the community or the country.87 Because of the
82

Stiglitz, supra note 67, at 320–21.
Id.
84
Wallbott, Wolff, & Pozarowska, supra note 81, at 41.
85
TKDL, supra note 42 (India); STATE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE OF
THE P.R.C. http://www.sipo.gov.cn (last visited Oct. 27, 2017) (China); China
Traditional Chinese Medicine Patent Database Search System, STATE
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY
OFFICE
OF
THE
PRC,
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/tk/en/wipo_iptk_bkk_09/wipo_iptk_bkk_09_t
opic5_2.pdf (last visited Oct. 27, 2017); Choi, supra note 77 (South Korea);
Korean Traditional Knowledge Portal, KOREAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
OFFICE, http://www.koreantk.com/ktkp2014/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2017).
86
Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) Access Agreement, U.S.-India
(Nov. 23, 2009) (Copy with author); Traditional Knowledge Digital Library
(TKDL) Access Agreement, Eur.-India, (Copy with author); Ministry of Sci. &
Tech., India and Japan Sign TKDL Access Agreement, PRESS INFO. BUREAU (Apr.
20, 2011, 6:53 PM), http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelcontent.aspx?relid=71713.
87
See Saez, supra note 78.
83
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lack of active use of these databases, their potential to enhance
global social welfare (for instance in bioprospecting88 projects) is
currently not being realized.
A collaborative initiative will be able to solve this inefficient
state of affairs. It has been noted that citizens of countries in the
Global North benefit considerably from the continued availability of
TK and biodiversity resources predominantly sourced from the
Global South.89 This fact should justify a requirement that the North
invest in TK codification initiatives taking place in the South in
some form. Since benefits that citizens of countries in the Global
North receive from TK and biodiversity resources in the South are
diffused benefits, it is reasonable that the governments of the Global
North should support TK codification in the South in the same way
funds collected through taxes are used for diffused public benefits.
Thus, the real potential of TK is realized in situations where the
North and South collaborate to bring together their comparative
advantages to increase global access to TK. In the same way that
production of modern knowledge requires a global framework for
optimal production and use,90 this challenge calls for a legal
intervention at both the domestic and international levels.
Yet another limitation that could explain the failure of
government provision of TK is the political and social tension that
may exist between knowledge-holder communities and the
governments under which they exist. Although such tension exists
in the case of many local communities, it is heightened in the case
of enclave territories in which indigenous communities are usually
88

“Bioprospecting can be defined as the systematic search for and development of
new sources of chemical compounds, genes, micro-organisms, macro-organisms, and
other valuable products from nature.” WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, TRIPS, CBD
AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINES: CONCEPTS AND QUESTIONS. REPORT OF AN ASEAN
WORKSHOP ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE (2001),
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/en/d/Jh2996e/6.3.html. Bioprospectors use genetic
resources and traditional knowledge of indigenous peoples and local communities to in
their research. Id. This can be contrasted with the alternative method of producing
synthetic compounds or screening samples of genetic resources for active ingredients
without the use of traditional knowledge. Id.
89
See generally Remigius N. Nwabueze, Ethnopharmacology, Patents and the
Politics of Plants’ Genetic Resources, 11 CARDOZO J. INT. COMP. L. 585 (2003).
90
Stiglitz, supra note 67, at 320–21.
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marginalized by settler communities. As a result, proposals for
government supply or subsidy of TK might be highly limited in
some instances. In cases where TK holders trust foreign entities
more than their governments, market provision might be more
effective in encouraging investment in TK than government support.
In the same way that government supply or subsidy is
complemented by the market in modern knowledge production, TK
needs a complementary source. Although government investment in
the infrastructure and substantive codification of TK is promising, it
faces considerable limitations that should be addressed through
other channels, such as the encouragement of private investments.
B. Recognition of Private Rights
The recognition of private rights has encouraged investments in
production and dissemination of modern knowledge.91 Intellectual
property rights have arguably encouraged private investments in the
production and dissemination of know-how, at least in some
industries.92 Following such measure, advocates of TK protection
suggest that recognizing private rights in TK would encourage
knowledge-holder communities and/or outsiders to invest in the
codification and disclosure of TK.93 Recognition of a private right
would address the inappropriability problem by artificially making
TK excludable. The public goods nature of TK would be limited,
thereby encouraging private investment in the codification and
disclosure of TK. This can be expected to encourage the investment
91

Dan L. Burk, The Role of Patent Law in Knowledge Codification, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1009, 1009–12 (2008).
92
While the impact of intellectual property rights in encouraging innovation is
highly debated, industries that involve considerable R & D investment and
produce outputs that can easily be copied seem to benefit the most. For example,
the pharmaceutical industry responds to the granting of patent rights. See
generally Kendall W. Artz et al., A Longitudinal Study of the Impact of R&D,
Patents, and Product Innovation on Firm Performance, 27 J. PRODUCT
INNOVATION MGMT 725, 728–37 (2010) (discussing the effects of R&D spending
and patents in announcement of new products in multiple industries including in
the pharmaceutical industry).
93
OGUAMANAM, supra note 27, at 6–7; CARLOS MARIA CORREA, PROTECTION
AND PROMOTION OF TRADITIONAL MEDICINE: I MPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC HEALTH
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2002),
http://apps.who.int/medicinedocs
/pdf/s4917e/s4917e.pdf.
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of considerable financial resources and expertise that users of TK,
such as biopharmaceutical firms, hold in TK codification and
disclosure. Carefully crafted private rights could be granted to
knowledge-holder communities to enable them to enter into
collaboration with TK users.
There are two ways in which proponents of property rights
approach the issues. The first proposes to protect TK under a
“property rule,”94 while the second is to protect TK under a liability
rule.95 Under such framework, users would be allowed to use TK
without asking for consent from TK holders. If and when the use of
TK results in a successful product, users are required to compensate
TK holders. Such compensation usually takes a form of profit
sharing. Given the diversity of interests among stakeholders on the
use and dissemination of TK, the adoption of different alternative
property rights regimes is suitable. While in some situations
requesting consent from rights holders may be feasible, in other
scenarios, the multiplicity of rights holders could render a property
rule regime ineffective.
However, the recognition of private rights is not without its
limitations. Since the recognition of private rights encourages selfinterested private actors, users may only be interested in investing
in TK that has a readily available commercial value. This may result
in the neglect of TK that does not have a readily available
commercial value but which may prove to be valuable in the future.
To address this shortcoming, TK codification and disclosure should
be supported by public sources of funding, including government
subsidy and altruistic grants.
C. Secrecy
Secrecy is a common channel for the production and use of
valuable knowledge by private firms. Scholars have recently pointed
94

A right protected under a property rule would give the right holder the power
to exclude others from using the right. Injunction could be granted against those
that violate such right. Whereas, a right protected under a liability rule only gives
the right holder the right to be compensated.
95
Reichman & Lewis, supra note 31, at 337–38; Jerome Reichman, Of Green
Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in Subpatentable Innovation, 53
VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1777–78 (2000).
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to the potential of trade secret law as a protection mechanism for
TK.96 The core assumption in such a scenario is that the knowledge
producer has the capacity to keep knowledge from being accessed
by competitors or the general public. At least in the case of TMK,
attempts by TK holders to keep the knowledge secret seem to be the
trend rather than the exception. The use of spiritual and cultural
ceremonies during the use of TMK and the strict personal
relationships that seem to dominate the transfer of TMK from
healers to apprentices imply that knowledge-holder communities
have attempted to keep TK secret.97 Such attempts, at least among
some indigenous communities, are mechanisms of TMK
appropriation intended to prevent its disclosure to outsiders.98
However, some of these measures, such as bundling TMK with
religious ceremonies, might not be sufficient to restrict access to
TMK by outside users as experts in the use of plants for
bioprospecting may distinguish between a ceremonious procedure
and one intended to extract healing elements.99 As a measure to
effectively exclude outsiders, some indigenous groups refuse to
communicate their knowledge and ceremonies with outsiders.100
To effectively keep TK a trade secret, knowledge-holder
communities would need to expend significant resources to create
physical or institutional structure that excludes outsiders or legal
expertise to enforce confidentiality when violations occur. Most
TK-holder communities will lack such resources. Therefore,
keeping outsiders from accessing TMK does not seem to be a
feasible route to encourage investments in TMK codification and
disclosure.
More importantly, however, stopping outsiders from accessing
TK is not a global welfare enhancing solution, i.e., it would still
mean that the general public would not benefit from, for instance,
96

See, e.g., Long, supra note 64; Deepa Varadarajan, Trade Secret Approach
to Protecting Traditional Knowledge, 36 YALE J. INT’L. L. 371, 375 (2011).
97
UMAR FARUK ADAMU, MODERN AND TRADITIONAL MEDICINE: CONFLICTS
AND RECONCILIATION 54 (2013).
98
Carvalho, supra note 33, at 245.
99
PETRA EBERMANN, 10 PATENTS AS PROTECTION OF TRADITIONAL MEDICAL
KNOWLEDGE? A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS 129 (2012).
100
Carvalho, supra note 33, at 245.
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cheaper drugs. Even if knowledge holders are successful in keeping
TK secret, it does not guarantee that the alarming rate of TK loss
would be stopped. In fact, secrecy, combined with pressures that
continue to destroy the social, economic, and environmental
structures of knowledge-holder communities, could increase its rate
of loss. For instance, reports from ethnobotanical projects frequently
state that in many communities only elders and traditional healers
have access to TMK and that when elders and traditional healers die,
their knowledge dies with them.101 The fact that access to TMK in
many communities is a privilege reserved only for elders and
traditional healers means that TMK will be lost forever if it is kept
secret in the face of these socio-economic and environmental
pressures disrupting the structures that support its use. Some
common examples of these pressures include policies of cultural
assimilation or “modernization,” restrictions on access to ancestral
lands, and destruction of ecosystems on which source communities
rely.
Furthermore, most knowledge holders do not have the capacity
to develop pharmaceutical products to meet national or global
demand. As a solution, it is possible to license a trade secret to firms
that have the capacity to meet the demand for such products.
However, licensing without any recognized rights over such a secret
is risky, due to the chance of confusion on the scope of the license,
and the lack of legal guidance that parties may find. Negotiating
over uncodified knowledge will also make it harder for parties to
draft contracts. These risks might explain the lack of successful
collaborations. Firms in such industries have the capacity to keep
the knowledge secret while at the same time being able to
commercialize it on a global scale. In contrast, knowledge-holder
communities will have a very limited capacity to use their
knowledge while ensuring its secrecy.
D. Group Cooperation
In intellectual property literature, there are examples of normbased systems through which knowledge goods are produced by
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high-end chefs102 and stand-up comedians103 in the absence of legal
intervention. The social sanctions of being ostracized are at times
sufficient to deter chefs and comedians from stealing recipes and
punch lines. Norm-based systems, such as the production of
knowledge goods through group cooperation, provide alternative
channels for the production of the public goods of knowledge. When
norm-based systems are used, members of a community would be
expected to invest in research and development, i.e., the production
of knowledge goods, despite the absence of (or despite reduced)
incentives in terms of direct personal gain. Norm-based systems,
however, seem to require close relationships among community
members and repeated interactions in order for social sanctions
against deviations to be effective.
These scenarios work because of the close social ties members
of such communities have with each other and with their audience,
which make the social sanctions effective. It could be claimed that
the close social ties that have historically existed among members
of knowledge-holder communities created and sustained the normbased regulations that worked for the use of TK within the
community.
However, TK users do not have close ties with knowledgeholder communities in the same way high-end chefs and stand-up
comedians do. Therefore, TK-holder communities would not be able
to use social sanctions against users who violate those sanctions in
another part of the world. For example, the San people of the
Kalahari Desert would not be able to use social sanctions against
firms that were involved in attempts to produce a pharmaceutical
product from the Hoodia plant. The firms involved (Phytopharm,
Pfizer, and Unilever) do not have close social ties with the San
people, and there may not be repeated interactions between these
stakeholders. Thus, the San people would be unable to set up a
102
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successful social norm of access and benefit-sharing with
pharmaceutical firms, research institutions, and the clients of such
firms in distant locations. Because TK usually crosses political,
cultural, and economic boundaries, its regulation through group
cooperation as used by chefs and other close-knit societies is
improbable.
A “knowledge commons” type of institutional set-up may have
some potential. This system would involve self-governing entities
formally or informally organized under a clear statement of rights
and responsibilities of the members of the commons. A good
example of a “knowledge commons” is a patent pool in which patent
holders in a certain industry cross-license their patent rights to make
it easier to produce products requiring multiple patent inventions.
The members of the patent pool agree on the terms of the commons
such as membership and scope of rights. Many successful
knowledge commons involve parties that have legally recognized
and enforceable rights.104 Although informal self-governing
knowledge commons have the potential to facilitate bioprospecting
partnerships, the absence of a defined legal backdrop and the
considerable
power
imbalance
between
stakeholders
(biopharmaceutical firms and source communities) may affect the
success of a TK commons. However, the potential for a knowledge
commons approach requires a detailed study to assess its potential
and limitations.
E. Other Channels
Other alternative channels for the production of knowledge do
not seem to be promising in the case of TK. For example, TK does
not involve as high a cost of copying as in the case of technologically
advanced knowledge.105 Therefore, the deterrence from copying that
exists in advanced industries does not apply to TK. The first-mover
advantage, or lead time advantage, that applies in advanced
industries emanates from a breakthrough invention to which
competitors do not yet have access to. In the case of TK, because of
104
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its incremental nature, it seems unlikely that such channels would
bring about a sufficient commercial advantage necessary to
encourage investment in TK codification and disclosure.
From the analysis of alternative channels provided above, the
recognition of private rights seems to hold a strong potential to
encourage private actors to collaborate with TK-holder communities
in the codification and disclosure of TK. This does not mean that it
is the only channel that should be adopted. In fact, the recognition
of private rights will need to be supplemented by public investment
and secrecy in order to address the urgent and complex problem of
TK loss. While the adoption of a diverse approach is encouraged, it
seems necessary to provide a detailed examination of what a
“private rights” alternative could look like as a TK governance
framework. Thus, the following sections are devoted to outlining
how such a channel could be applied in the case of TMK.
III.

A COMMUNAL RIGHTS BASED FRAMEWORK: ONE OF
MULTIPLE ALTERNATIVES
In a consultative workshop on TK, Graham Dutfield, a leading
scholar in international IP law, suggested that because of the
diversity of interests involved in TK protection, what is needed is a
“buffet of rights” rather than one uniform regime.106 The
bioprospecting right described in the following section is just one
option in a buffet of rights that could be used to address the complex
issue of TMK protection. It should also be noted that the proposed
mechanism is a voluntary system with respect to knowledge-holder
communities and it is plausible that some communities might not
want to participate in the system for various reasons. Other
mechanisms, such as keeping TK secret and contracting with users
regarding access,107 could also be implemented to address the
concerns of communities who prefer to opt out of the proposed
regime.
106
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A. Definition and Purpose of the Bioprospecting Right
The bioprospecting right proposed in this article is a cluster of
rights that emanate from bioprospecting activity based on TMK.
Depending on the type of TMK database, it includes an exclusive
right to conduct bioprospecting, a right to share profits of
bioprospecting over TMK codified in a publicly accessible database,
or a right to receive compensation for unauthorized bioprospecting
on TMK codified in a restricted database. The right will be granted
to source communities that codify their TMK either in a publicly
accessible database or in a restricted database to which a
government agency or other entity could access. The two types of
databases and rights emanating from them are discussed in detail in
section III.D.1 of this article.
The purpose of granting the bioprospecting right is to encourage
the codification and disclosure of TMK. This “incentive to codify”
rationale has two sides: the supply side and the demand side. On the
supply side, the regime encourages knowledge-holder communities
to codify and disclose their knowledge. On the demand side, it
encourages entrepreneurs who want to help knowledge-holder
communities in codifying and disclosing their knowledge to invest
in that process. Economic efficiency would require the granting of
rights so long as it is efficient and necessary to meet these purposes.
B. Core requirements
While it may be relatively easier to make a case for the granting
of rights to source communities, the scope and conditions of these
rights are the more contentious aspects. In order to craft a workable
framework, parameters must be set which outline the steps needed
to receive legal protection. This is necessary to ensure that the
system works to encourage codification and disclosure without
discouraging follow-on innovation. In this regard, the following four
requirements should be put in place under the bioprospecting right.
First, the applicant must either be the knowledge-holder
community, a representative of the community, or a person who has
received Prior Informed Consent (PIC) from the knowledge-holder
community. Here, one can imagine that source communities will
have legal representation through which the community’s
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relationship with outsiders is handled. If the applicant is a member
of the knowledge-holder community, customary laws of that
community should govern internal issues of ownership and
application. But if the applicant is an outsider, there is a need to
ensure that the applicant has obtained proper consent from the
knowledge-holder community. Such a requirement is necessary to
reverse the protectionist trend, in which TK holders are becoming
increasingly restrictive in providing access to their TK and genetic
resources. Allowing anyone to receive rights over TMK without
receiving consent from knowledge-holder communities will further
encourage a protectionist trend and affect the sustainability of the
bioprospecting industry. These are the very scenarios the proposed
regime seeks to avoid.
To facilitate relationships between knowledge-holder
communities and outsiders interested in applying for TMK
codification, it is advisable to establish guidelines for how consent
is received from a knowledge-holder community. These guidelines
could outline recommended procedures and minimum standards
with the goal of safeguarding the system from abuse and providing
clarity and security to the parties involved. The Nagoya Protocol,108
which was signed to explain the Convention on Biodiversity, calls
on member countries to establish standards for the “prior informed
consent or approval and involvement of indigenous and local
communities” (PIC) in access to genetic resources and associated
TK.109 Since the goal in the bioprospecting right proposed in this
article is to empower TK-holder communities and to create the
confidence needed to codify TK, the effective consent of TK-holder
communities is essential. Therefore, the jurisdiction in question
should develop a suitable framework through which outsiders could
receive the effective consent of TK holders.
Second, the applicant, if not a representative of the knowledgeholder community, must have entered into a benefit-sharing
agreement with the knowledge-holder community. As with PIC, a
108
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guideline that outlines certain minimum standards might help
facilitate the relationship and protect knowledge-holder
communities against abuse by sophisticated knowledge users. The
Nagoya Protocol and its annex on “monetary and non-monetary
benefits” call for the “fair and equitable” sharing of benefits under
“mutually agreed terms.”110 This framework could be used as a base
to build an equitable benefit sharing guideline. Source communities
could, however, negotiate for more terms and conditions than those
listed in the minimum standards. Reference to other licensing
regimes would be helpful here as a reference point. Legal
representation will also be helpful here. Each jurisdiction should
ensure that TK holders receive a “fair and equitable” share of the
benefits in agreements they enter into with licensees. Setting
minimum standards and conditions may help in this regard, and it is
necessary to avoid a repetition of the negative past experience where
indigenous and local communities entered into agreements without
understanding the nuances and implications of the agreement.111
Third, the application must clearly specify the scope of the
knowledge being claimed. It goes without saying that the knowledge
that is expected to receive legal protection will have to be clearly
stated. This is necessary for the purposes of codification, disclosure,
and enforcement of rights. Without a clearly stated scope, users will
not know if they are infringing upon a right or what rights they are
infringing upon. Intangible properties are inherently difficult to
define compared to physical properties, which has physical limits.
Therefore, clearly specifying the scope of TMK over which legal
protection is sought is even more essential than is the case with
physical property.
The level of disclosure and enablement required by patent laws
should not, however, be required in the case of TMK. Traditional
healers and members of the knowledge holding community may be
unable to specify TMK in the way a scientist would be able to
describe an invention.112 A system of protection which adopts a
110
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patent-like specification requirement risks being unworkable.
Carvalho suggests setting up an easy requirement for the disclosure
of “minimally enabling” information—information that would
enable another person to comprehend what the knowledge-holder
community does and how to replicate it.113 A requirement of
enabling disclosure along the lines of such standards might suffice
for the proposed system.
Fourth, the knowledge claimed must not already be widely
diffused. The more that knowledge is diffused, the harder it is to find
the community from which it originated for the purpose of assigning
rights. The cost of locating the originating community and the
uncertainty surrounding the question of which community to consult
may discourage significant follow-on innovation. However, this
requirement begs the question of how diffused TMK has to be before
it is no longer able to receive protection. This is a hard question to
address, and it may be impossible to set a clearly defined line.
Instead, it may help to specify certain standards such as the ability
of the applicant to produce evidence demonstrating the origins of
the knowledge. Practicality would require the granting of protection
to cases in which claimants produce satisfactory evidence
supporting the community as the source of that TMK. Ultimately,
courts would have to draw the contours of protectable TMK and that
which is too diffused to belong to the applicant (claimant).
In regard to diffused knowledge, it should be noted that some
TMK could be held by more than one community. This could be a
result of historical connections between the communities or
independent discovery. Multiple origins for the same or similar
TMK might create challenges for the proposed system of TMK
protection. It may also increase the costs of users in deciding which
community to consult. However, it is possible to respond to such
situations through innovative flexibilities. For example, a “joint
ownership” type of right could be granted to multiple communities
that can prove to have created and developed the TMK. TMK
databases would also be able to facilitate the establishment of joint
rights.
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C. Applying the Bioprospecting Right: The Goodya Plant
Since the previous sections provided the core requirements of
the proposed bioprospecting right, a hypothetical case may be a
useful tool to help explain these features. The case of the Goodya
plant is provided to show what the scope of the right may be and
what a narrow and broad scope of TMK codification could look like.
***
The Fan people—a community in a remote corner of the world—
use the Goodya plant to treat depression. Before this traditional
treatment begins, the patient must first undergo a three-week
training in which she learns all the spiritual songs of the Fan people
and a dance called Hammer. The ritual for the treatment is only
conducted on top of Mount Dashen—the highest mountain in the
Fan people’s traditional territory—and is held after sunset because
the spirits of ancestors are the strongest at such time. The Goodya
plant grows on top of the mountain during the spring season. All
adult members of the Fan people are required to attend the
ceremony. The patient will sit in the center of the group while the
Conga—the traditional healer—stands next to the patient, fully
adorned in face-paintings and a ‘garment of the wise men.’ Other
members of the community sit in circles around the patient. The
patient’s family forms the first circle, and close friends will form the
second circle. Each circle represents the person’s closeness with the
patient.
The ceremony takes two hours. The first part of the ritual takes
approximately an hour in which the patient leads the group in a
chant progressively increasing with intensity. When the traditional
healer believes the patient is ready the second part of the ritual
begins.
This is when the Conga, with the help of his first-born son, makes
the patient drink a beverage made of the Goodya plant. The juice is
made with a mixture of spices and an extract of the fruits and leaves
of the Goodya plant. The healer picks the Goodya leaves and fruits
when they are still green, he dries them in the sun and grinds them
into a powder. The powder is boiled for approximately half an hour
before it is left to simmer an hour longer. The healer then pours the
mixture into a clay pot which is custom made for this mixture. The

292

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 19: 257

mixture is kept for three weeks in underground storage before it is
reheated for use a few hours before the ceremony. After the patient
drinks the reheated mixture, she joins the rest of the community in
the Hammer dance in which the spirits of ancestors are expected to
join. The patient is expected to drink the Goodya mixture daily for a
full week. The healer checks in with the patient every night to see
the progress she has made. Friends and family are also expected to
visit the patient during this healing week.
***
If the Fan people were interested in receiving protection under
the proposed bioprospecting right, they would codify and disclose
their knowledge through an agency established for this purpose. The
Conga or the chief may be authorized to act as a community
representative under the customary law of the Fan people. Thus,
either the Conga or the chief would be the contact person in the
process of TMK codification and disclosure. The Fan people could
also choose to enter into an agreement with a firm that could
undertake the codification and disclosure of TMK. This agreement
would have to fulfill the first core requirement of the
bioprospecting—that of Prior Informed Consent114 of the Fan people
as set out in the Nagoya Protocol.
Determining what types of uses infringe upon the bioprospecting
right and which uses are legal will be challenging. Here, it may be
helpful to adopt the “substantial reliance” test suggested by William
Fisher.115 According to the test, source communities would have
rights against users who relied substantially on TMK in the
production of inventions, products, and processes.116 It is
acknowledged that the substantial reliance standard is a vague one
that does not give sufficient direction regarding what types of uses
will amount to infringement.117 However, the vagueness is necessary
to allow the proposed mechanism to cover the diverse ways in which
114
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outsiders use TMK. The court or other entity adjudicating the claim
of infringement of a bioprospecting right would examine all the
evidence and decide if the user relied on TMK to such a degree that
it is a “substantial use.” The simple act of a user obtaining access to
codified TMK should not be considered substantial reliance on such
knowledge, but situations in which the use of TK enabled users to
save time and/or resources in the production of the final product
should usually be considered to meet the substantial reliance test.
Additionally, substantial reliance should also be found in cases in
which the use of TK changed the research direction significantly in
a way that enabled users to produce a successful product.
Since courts currently engage in similar exercises in enforcing
patent laws, they could develop jurisprudence regarding the
appropriate parameters of substantial reliance. The doctrine of
equivalents allows courts to decide that an act “substantially
similar” to the patented invention infringes if it does “substantially
the same function, in substantially the same way, to yield
substantially the same result.”118 Acts that are substantially similar
to those stated in the patent claim would be considered
infringements. The substantial reliance standard in TK use could
also be developed by courts in the same way that they developed the
doctrine of equivalents. In the hypothetical case provided above, the
Fan people will have the rights outlined below (see Section III.D.1)
against users who relied substantially on the codification of TMK
related to the Goodya plant.
The third core requirement of the bioprospecting right may help
in the above-discussed analysis. The documentation of TMK must
clearly state what the knowledge is in as much detail as possible.119
In the case of the Goodya plant, the documentation should provide
the traditional and scientific name of the plant, how the plant is used,
and the expected effects of the plant. Further discussion on the
nature and scope that TMK codification should take is provided in
Section III.D.1 below.
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The final core requirement is that the knowledge should not
already be widely diffused.120 Any part of the codified knowledge of
the Goodya plant, the procedures followed in providing treatment,
and its ability to treat depression would not be under the exclusive
right of the Fan people if any of this is already widely diffused. A
challenging task here is determining how diffused TMK has to be
before losing its ability to be protected under the proposed system.
This challenge becomes even more essential given the prevalence of
multiple communities holding variations of similar TMK. The fact
that another community uses the Goodya plant and its procedures to
treat depression should not exclude it from protection. If these
communities are found in close proximity to one another, yet still
both secluded from mainstream communities, there is still value in
protecting this knowledge in order to encourage its codification and
disclosure. The two communities could be considered co-owners.
However, the more mainstream the communities are, i.e., the closer
they are to ‘modern’ lifestyles, the more communities there are that
potentially hold the knowledge, and the narrower the scope the
bioprospecting right should be. In other words, based on the
substantial reliance standard, the more diffused a TMK is, the less
that users rely on TMK from one community. If users did not rely
substantially on a codified TMK, then bioprospecting rights cannot
be claimed.
For instance, if communities neighboring the Fan use a different
species of plant that has the same family as the Goodya plant, the
Fan people’s bioprospecting right could be limited to the use of the
Goodya plant and the other community could have rights over other
types of plants they use to treat depression. If a community
documents one variety or species of the plant, and the user firm
conducts research on another variety with more promising potential,
the source community’s right depends on how much the firm relied
on the first variety/species to understand the value of the second
plant variety/species. This is because a community could only claim
the part of TMK codification that the community holds to the
exclusion of the outside world. Similar to the issue of infringement,
this issue would also have to be addressed through courts or
120
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legislation. However, attempts should be made to establish coownership when communities hold the same or similar TMK in
order to facilitate its use by outsiders and the benefit-sharing
process.
D. Scope of the Bioprospecting Rights
Following the discussions regarding the conditions of the
bioprospecting right, the scope of such right is the other key issue
that needs to be resolved. Economics literature suggests that
exclusive rights on knowledge goods increases the cost of followon innovation and can deter it altogether.121 Therefore, the granting
of exclusive rights over such goods should be justified through the
innovation-enhancing effects of such rights. The welfare gains from
an increase in the rate of invention—caused by the incentive of
gaining a right—should be greater than the deterrence of follow-on
innovation.122 It is not an easy task to investigate the correct scope
of protection that would encourage optimal codification and
disclosure; however, an attempt should be made to carve out a
justifiable scope and balance the interests of knowledge-holders,
users, and the general public. The optimal scope, in terms of
economic efficiency, of such a right is that which encourages the
maximum codification and disclosure of TMK by knowledgeholders without overburdening follow-on innovation.
It is challenging to determine what the optimal scope of a
bioprospecting right should be to achieve the goal of encouraging
optimal TMK codification and disclosure. To date, there is no
agreement on the optimal scope of intellectual property rights.123
Any attempt to establish an optimal scope for TMK is only made
harder because the market has not yet fully responded to TMK.124
The exact scope of the right will be greatly affected by the policy
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objective of the country adopting the regime.125 Although there are
bound to be differences in scope from one country to another, there
are nonetheless core factors that should be considered in setting the
scope of bioprospecting rights. Policy makers setting up the
proposed regime will have to consider which factors to prioritize
based on the jurisdiction’s interests.
The scope of a bioprospecting right could be described in terms
of its breadth and length. The breadth of the right relates to what the
right holder will be able to rightfully claim. Breadth outlines the
scope of the bioprospecting right within which rights and
obligations arise. The length of the right refers to whether the right
expires, and if so, at what time and under what conditions. Different
scopes of the bioprospecting right can be expected to have different
effects in encouraging applicants to codify and disclose TMK. It can
be expected that the larger the scope, the more that applicants would
be encouraged to invest in TMK codification. However, the scope
should also not overly reward applicants with a right which is
unjustifiably broad.
1.

Breadth of the Bioprospecting Right
The breadth of the bioprospecting right relates to the limits of
the right within which the right holder has legally protected
interests. In contrast to rights over physical property, the limits of
rights over intangible property are harder to define. Despite this
challenge, the law has been able to set out legal “fences” that set out
the breadth of rights over intangible property.126 Here, it may be
beneficial to draw an analogy to similar types of protection in patent
law. A patentee receives the exclusive right to make, use, and sell
the patented invention.127 The breadth of a patent right depends on
the specific claims that are approved by the patent office.128 Users
125
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who make, use, or sell inventions covered under a claim would thus
be infringing upon the patent right.129 A similar claims-based right,
but one that reflects the unique features of TMK and the
bioprospecting process, could be set up for the proposed right.
If the proposed system is to reach its full potential, a core
difference that cannot be avoided is the differing levels of interest in
making the documented TMK either publicly accessible or
restricted. Below, two types of TMK databases and the rights that
may arise from them are analyzed.
a. Two Types of Databases
The scope of a bioprospecting right would depend on the type of
disclosure (i.e., the type of TMK database). There would be two
types of databases: (1) a publicly accessible database and (2) a
restricted database. TMK in a restricted database will only be
accessible to the source community and the relevant agency with
which the TMK is registered. The reason for creating two types of
databases relates to the need to encompass communities with
differing interests with regard to the accessibility of their
knowledge.
The ideal scenario in terms of encouraging innovation may be
the disclosure of TMK in a publicly accessible database. The public
accessibility of the database will inform users in the industry about
the existence of the knowledge whom will then create spillover
effects that spur innovation. For instance, the accessibility of the
TMK database could reveal an important piece of information to
researchers in a seemingly unrelated field.
However, some knowledge-holder communities and their
licensees may be opposed to the public disclosure of their TMK.
Communities may seek to keep their TMK secret because disclosure
or commercialization is against their worldview. Other communities
might be opposed to public disclosure because they want to
commercialize their TMK while keeping it a secret. In both cases,
there is an efficiency argument for encouraging these actors to invest
in the documentation of a disappearing body of knowledge. If the
proposed protection was made conditional on the actors publicly
129
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disclosing their TMK, it might result in excluding these two groups.
A system which encourages the documentation of TMK in a
restricted database should be preferred over one that simply allows
bodies of knowledge to disappear.
The discussion of restricted TMK databases hints at the
possibility of protecting the knowledge through laws that govern
trade secrets. Scholars have proposed the protection of TMK
through trade secret laws,130 which do not have many rigid
requirements. Information which is not publicly accessible and
provides its holder with a competitive advantage in its business
could be protected under this regime so long as the owner takes
reasonable measures to keep the knowledge from falling into the
hands of unauthorized persons.131 The absence of sophisticated
requirements for protection makes trade secret regimes the apparent
candidate for TMK protection. However, the core problem
identified in this article—the alarming rate of TMK loss—would not
be sufficiently addressed through such regimes because trade secret
regimes are not designed to encourage the documentation of secret
knowledge.
In order to respond to the unique features of TMK, trade secret
regimes could be modified to encourage TMK documentation. This
is where the protection of restricted TMK databases becomes
important. The protection of bioprospecting rights in restricted
TMK databases is similar to trade secret protection in that it does
not require the public disclosure of information. However, the active
encouragement of TMK documentation would be an inherent part
of such a system.
The protection of restricted TMK databases would encourage
two groups of communities that are interested in using the legal
framework. It would allow communities interested in
commercializing their TMK while preferring to keep it secret to
codify their TK in restricted databases. The framework provides
them with the necessary legal rights on which to base their
130
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negotiation. It will also encourage communities not interested in
commercializing TMK at all to invest in documenting their TMK to
prevent its loss. These types of databases could be used as a
repository of TMK and as evidence of its existence and ownership.
In order to facilitate the licensing of TMK in both public and
restricted databases, the database could include information on the
ways in which users could obtain a license from the knowledgeholder community or their representative. The information could
include the name and contact address, any rules and practices that
must be followed to receive a license, etc. In restricted databases,
TMK would not be fully disclosed, but a general statement could be
included to guide potential users in their licensing initiatives. This
feature of TMK databases could save significant transaction costs
for the bioprospecting industry.
b. Two Types of Rights
The two types of TMK databases discussed above should give
rise to two sets of rights that are consistent with the features of the
database.
There are two alternative frameworks for granting the right over
TMK disclosed in a publicly available database. The first grants
source communities an exclusive right to undertake bioprospecting
based on the publicly disclosed TMK. The right would include the
exclusive right to make, use, and sell products and services that
result from the bioprospecting project based on the documented
TMK. Since most knowledge-holder communities may not have the
resources required to commercialize their knowledge, it can be
anticipated that they will license these rights either in whole or in
part. Interested users could license this right from the right holders,
and the particularities of the license would be left to the parties to
decide. Because of the unpredictable nature of bioprospecting, this
framework could be expected to establish a royalty-based system in
which users would share profits with right holders only if they have
been successful in producing a product based on the particular
TMK. An upfront lump sum payment combined with royalty
payment could also be used.
If such a framework is adopted, there is a risk that the source
community would have an incentive to over claim the value of TMK
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by listing a long list of conditions that the TMK covers without
necessarily having used the TMK for such conditions. Since right
holders would have the power to grant or refuse consent for
bioprospecting over the TMK, they can use this powerful right and
over claim the value of TMK. If parties to a license establish a
royalty-based system in which fees are paid only if there is a
successful product, the incentive to over claim will be reduced.
However, right holders could insist on up-front lump sum payments
instead of a royalty-based fee system, and therefore still have an
incentive to over claim. The uncertainty related to measurements of
licensee fees could increase the transaction costs involved. The
system would benefit both knowledge-holding communities and
firms if this risk could be mitigated.
In patent laws of several jurisdictions, there are doctrines
designed to reduce the incentive to over claim.132 A key doctrine in
this regard is the requirement that inventions have “utility.” Patent
applicants are required to establish the utility or usefulness of an
invention either through demonstration or through “sound
prediction.”133 To benefit from the doctrine of sound prediction,
patent applicants have to show, through a combination of factual
statements and sound line of reasoning, that the claimed invention
could be expected to do what the patent claims.134 Additionally,
patent specifications are required to disclose enough information to
allow a Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art (PHOSITA), who
follows the instructions, to produce the claimed invention.135 While
these requirements may reduce the incentive to over claim in patent
applications, it is challenging to adopt similar requirements for the
bioprospecting regime proposed in this article. This is because
source communities may not be able to explain their TMK in
scientific terms to meet the standards of sound prediction.
Additionally, requiring that TMK codification include explanations
on how it addresses certain conditions can be expected to increase
the cost of codification, which in turn may reduce the incentive to
codify TMK. Therefore, the feasible alternative for users is to create
132
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a royalty-based agreement in which benefits are shared only where
the substantial reliance in the disclosed TMK results in a successful
drug.
The second alternative framework is to grant source
communities a right to benefit from successful bioprospecting
projects based on TMK disclosed in a publicly accessible database.
In this framework, users would be allowed to start bioprospecting
without having to obtain consent from the source community. If and
when a successful product is produced, using the publicly disclosed
TMK, rights holders would have the claim to an appropriate share
of the profits. The exact share of the profits could be calculated by
a court, a tribunal, or an agency based on an estimated contribution
that the TMK made to the final product. Jerome Reichman has
proposed a similar “liability rules” framework in which users are
allowed to use available knowledge and are only required to share
benefits once a successful product is produced.136
There is a risk of over-claiming within this framework as well.
However, because of the reduced power of the right, source
communities will have a highly limited incentive to over-claim.
Source communities can claim their right to a share of the profits
only if there is a successful product produced through a substantial
reliance on the publicly disclosed TMK. Because there is limited
chance that TMK, which has never been used to treat a condition,
could prove to be useful in treating that same condition, there is little
incentive to over claim. Even if source communities over-claim,
they have to overcome the challenging burden of proving that users
relied substantially on the over-claimed TMK to produce the
product from which profits are to be shared.
The first framework—granting source communities an
exclusive right to conduct bioprospecting—has two key advantages
when compared to the right to share benefits. First, it gives the right
holder a veto power over bioprospecting and thus forces users to
seek a license in advance. This will, in turn, make the process of
136
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enforcing the right much easier compared to a framework that
adopts the right to share benefits. In the latter case, since users can
use TMK in the publicly available database without the consent of
source communities, it may be challenging to identify and locate
users to ensure fair compensation. Anyone can access the publicly
available database, use it to produce a product, and claim to have
not relied on the TMK. To mitigate this problem, a presumption
could be put in place in which any user who begins conducting
research related to a TMK after the publication of the TMK in a
publicly accessible database would be presumed to have had access
to such TMK. Users will have the burden of proving that they started
to conduct research before the TMK publication and/or that they did
not substantially rely on the disclosed TMK in producing the
product. Second, the exclusive right can be licensed on an exclusive
basis, and therefore potential exclusive licensees who could earn
monopoly rents downstream would share them with right holders.
The prospect of earning higher profits from exclusive licenses could
be expected to encourage more investment in TMK codification.
Despite these major advantages, the exclusive right to conduct
bioprospecting involves the risk of over-claiming discussed above.
Furthermore, such framework may lock down wide areas of research
by giving an exclusive right to conduct research in such an area to
one entity. The second framework, in which source communities
have a right to share benefits, enables competition among
researchers in a particular field. It can also be expected to reduce the
transaction costs involved in locating and requesting a license from
source communities, which may be attractive for users. The absence
of this requirement may facilitate innovative activity based on the
TMK, as Reichman has argued.137 Although both frameworks have
advantages and disadvantages and policy makers could choose a
suitable framework, the second framework in which source
communities have a right to share the profits of a successful
bioprospecting process is preferred. This will greatly reduce the
incentive to over claim and can be expected to facilitate investment
and innovation in bioprospecting projects. The reduction of
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transaction costs should also facilitate bioprospecting partnerships
between users and source communities.
With regard to TMK codified in a restricted database, source
communities would have the exclusive right to license the TMK and
a right to obtain compensation from users who access the TMK
through unauthorized means.138 Once the source community (or its
representative) registers the TMK in a restricted database, individual
members of the community will be barred from communicating the
registered TMK without the consent of the community elders. Users
who induce a member to disclose the information or who violate the
rules of obtaining access would be liable for unauthorized access.
Information relating to the rules and principles that should be
followed to receive a license from the community, as decided by the
appropriate community representative, should be documented
together with the TMK.
The various remedies at the disposal of courts could be used to
respond further to the particulars of infringement cases that may
arise from the proposed bioprospecting right. As the Supreme Court
of Canada held in Cadbury Schweppes Inc. v. FBI Foods Ltd.,139 the
primary objective of calculating the proper mode of compensation
in breach of confidential information cases is to arrive at an
equitable result given the facts of the case, rather than a specific
amount of compensation.140 The court declared that because of the
way the common law has developed in the area, the suitable remedy
for a particular case could emanate from equity, contracts, torts, or
property.141 These remedies may include accounting for profits,
potential royalty fees that would have been paid, lost opportunity,
head-start (spring-board) compensations, and even injunctive relief
in the limited cases in which other remedies may not result in a fair
outcome. For instance, since most knowledge-holder communities
138

The right to obtain compensation could be facultative. If a malicious intent
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may not themselves be engaged in bioprospecting initiatives, there
may not be sufficient evidence for damages calculated as lost
profits. In these cases, adopting the head-start or spring-board
principle adopted in the Schweppes case may be beneficial. If courts
adopt this principle, the damage will be the value of the head-start
benefit the defendant received (i.e., the amount of financial expense
the defendant saved by accessing the TMK unlawfully).142
The above section outlines what the breadth of the
bioprospecting right may be in theory. The following section
examines a practical case that adopts a similar framework. The
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) has developed a
robust classification of TK which speaks to the different levels of
diffusion entailed in TK and the different potential rights that may
be available.143 Depending on the particular policy objective, the
adoption of a mixture of the proposed framework with the
classifications outlined by the WIPO may be beneficial.
c. WIPO’s Draft Framework
The WIPO has grouped the potential status in which TK may be
found and the possible alternative rights that knowledge holders
might be interested in (table reproduced below).144 Such mechanism
could be modified for use in the bioprospecting rights outlined in
this article to meet the needs of the jurisdiction that is considering
adopting the mechanism.
In the ‘nature of TK’ row, the tool categorizes TK progressively
from the least publicly available to the most publicly available. The
categorization lists secret knowledge, closely held knowledge,
publicly available knowledge, and widely diffused knowledge. With
respect to the possible rights that knowledge holders might receive,
the tool provides a menu of rights which includes exclusive property
rights, moral rights,145 protection against unfair competition, and
142
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compensation or benefit sharing. At times, the nature of the
knowledge might determine the best right. For example, an
exclusive property right for widely diffused knowledge might be
unworkable. Similarly, compensation or benefit sharing might not
be an alternative for spiritually or culturally important knowledge
that communities are not interested in commercializing. While
WIPO’s draft framework outlines the different scenarios, it does not
suggest any particular right for any one level of diffusion.
Nature
of TK

Secret Closely Publicly Widely
held
available diffused

Nature of
rights
Exclusive
property rights
Moral rights
Unfair
competition
Compensation/
benefit sharing
Table 1: WIPO’s Draft Framework for TK Protection146
2.

Term of Bioprospecting Right
As stated at the beginning of this section, the second factor
affecting the scope of a right is the length. The terms of
bioprospecting rights should depend on the type of TK database. In
the case of TK documented in a restricted database, protection
should last as long as the conditions for protection continue to exist.
As long as the TK remains secret and the TK-holder community
does not document it in a publicly accessible database, there should
the integrity of a work, and the right to publish a work anonymously. Moral rights
originated in the civil law legal system and, although limited, are recognized in
common law legal systems. Michael Rushton, The Moral Rights of Artists: Droit
Moral ou Droit Pécuniaire?, 22 J. CULT. ECON. 15 (1998).
146
WENDLAND, supra note 143.
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be a bioprospecting right in such TK. If the TK-holder community
decides to move TK from a restricted database to a publicly
accessible one, then the calculation of term limits should begin from
such time. In cases where TK-holder communities disclose the TK
before it is included in the restricted databases or it discloses without
confidentiality restrictions, the source community should still have
rights in the restricted TK so long as the core requirements of the
proposed bioprospecting right are met.
One implicit requirement is that protection of TK documented
in a restricted database would only last as long as the source
community. If the TK-holder community disappears, then TK
documented in a restricted database should be made freely
accessible. In order to determine when a TK holding community has
ceased to exist, the database could require the registration of a
contact person or representative of the source community. In cases
where no community representative claims rights to the documented
TK within a reasonable amount of time, rights in the documentation
could cease to exist.
With regard to TK documented in a publicly accessible database,
there should be some sort of term limit that begins from the time the
knowledge is officially documented in the database. Although some
stakeholders call for perpetual rights over TMK,147 economic
efficiency would call for the term of the proposed right to be limited
to a term that would encourage the optimal codification and
disclosure of TMK. Since the effect of a legal intervention to
encourage codification can only exist as long as knowledge-holder
communities continue to exist, efficiency requires that the exclusive
right should, at a maximum, lapse when the knowledge-holder
community disappears. However, the exact term can only be
determined after considerable theoretical and empirical research
into the range of incentives needed to encourage optimal
codification of TK. Until a jurisdiction is able to ascertain the
optimal term for a bioprospecting right, it should provide such right
on an experimental basis based on general references to the diverse
147
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terms of conventional and unconventional IP rights. It may be
argued that in such situations there is a risk that a source jurisdiction
might have a lengthy or perpetual bioprospecting right. However,
since adopting a perpetual or lengthy bioprospecting right would
discourage users from engaging with such jurisdiction, countries
might have an incentive to avoid highly restrictive systems.
The core question policy makers should take into consideration
is the effect that a term might have in encouraging TMK codification
and disclosure. If a term is too short, it may fail to encourage
knowledge-holder communities to codify their TMK. If the term is
too long, it may discourage users (who would have to pay royalty
fees for the duration of the term of the right) from using TMK in
bioprospecting projects. The appropriate term for TMK should be
one that strikes a balance between these extremes. It is reasonable
to presume that the longer the term of protection the stronger the
effect of the right in encouraging TMK codification and
disclosure.148 However, the incremental effect of an additional year
of protection will diminish as the term increases.
The purpose of establishing the bioprospecting right is to
encourage the codification and disclosure of TMK. However, as it
has been noted throughout this article, knowledge-holder
communities are widely divergent in background and interests. As a
result, the amount of protection that would encourage one
community to codify and disclose its knowledge might not have the
same effect on another community. Thus, a set of alternative
frameworks that give stakeholders some flexibility would be
suitable.
It is also worth reiterating that the term of the right is only one
factor in the overall scheme of encouraging TMK codification and
disclosure. The breadth of the right and other features of the
domestic legal system are essential to the incentive analysis. A
framework for TMK protection should take into consideration the
cumulative effect of these diverse features in encouraging
documentation and disclosure.

148
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Although most economists recommend term limits for
intellectual property rights,149 there is little evidence to indicate the
optimal term for intellectual property rights in general.150 In most
countries, standard patent terms are for 20 years from the date of the
application for a patent.151 In countries recognizing utility models
(otherwise known as petty patents), there are diverse but smaller
terms (usually 7–10 years) that are adopted for small
improvements.152 This implies that the optimal term for patent
protection depends on the subject matter of protection.153 Therefore,
it may be worthwhile to investigate the efficiencies involved in
differing terms for different TMK contributions to bioprospecting.154
In analyzing different terms of protection, policy makers should
consider the administrative costs involved. To make an analogy with
patents, the optimal system would be one that assesses the life of a
patent on a case-by-case basis; however, the administrative costs
would make such a system inefficient.155 Similarly, a case-by-case
analysis of optimal protection for TMK may be inefficient.
a. Factors Necessary for Setting the Term of Protection
Even if the goal of setting the optimal term of the proposed right
is elusive, there are some factors that should be considered when
determining the duration of a term. Therefore, instead of picking a
specific term for TMK, this section discusses the core factors that
should be considered in selecting such a term.
One core factor to consider is the incentivizing effect that patent
law has had on the codification and disclosure of modern
149
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inventions.156 Reichman and Lewis suggest that the term “should be
longer than we envision for present-day sub-patentable innovation”
because of the unique equity goals that are present in the use of the
knowledge of indigenous and local communities and “of the
typically slow accretion” of such knowledge.157 By “sub-patentable
innovation” Reichman and Lewis are referring to improvements on
existing knowledge that are not advanced enough to receive patent
protection.158 Both the equity and accretion rate rationales seem to
have some force, and both have implications for the incentive to
codify and disclose.159 Communities that have been oppressed for
generations might require a stronger right in order to undo centuries
of mistrust. The limited value that TMK has on its own also points
to the need for a longer term if the right is to be sufficient to
encourage the documentation and disclosure of TMK.160
Although Reichman and Lewis do mention the term of twenty
years in the hypothetical they use, they avoid suggesting what the
term should be.161 In most countries, present-day sub-patentable
innovations162 such as petty patents or utility models receive
protection for seven to ten years.163 Article 38 of the Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPs) allows member countries
to provide protection for up to fifteen years for “layout designs
(topographies) of integrated circuits.”164 Because of the low
standalone value of TMK, it seems that the term of protection should
156
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indeed be longer than other sub-patentable innovations that have a
readily available commercial value.
Another factor that should be considered in deciding what term
limits to adopt is the average time it takes to produce a successful
drug using TMK. The proposed term of protection should be longer
than the average bioprospecting time to allow communities and their
licensees who invest in the documentation and disclosure of TMK
to reap sufficient benefits. Those who invest in the codification and
disclosure will likely only receive a limited portion of the profits
that would accrue from a successful drug development process. This
is because the TMK contribution is usually going to occur in the
early stages of development and more research and development
investments would be required to produce a successful drug.
Therefore, in order for this limited share of the profits to be
sufficient to encourage communities to codify and disclose their
knowledge, the right would have to cover at least the average time
the bioprospecting process takes.
The average length of the drug discovery process has been
estimated to be twelve to fifteen years.165 This is a general estimate
that does not take into consideration the use of TMK in this process.
Therefore, the use of TMK might reduce this timeline significantly.
However, it is not easy to estimate by how much this timeline would
be reduced. More research is required to show what the duration of
average drug discovery would be when TMK is used. Despite the
uncertainty related to the average time the process may take, the
currently available twelve- to fifteen-year estimate could be used as
a reference point. It should be noted, however, that the expiration of
patent rights before investments in drug discovery are often
recouped is seen as a major problem in the biopharmaceutical
industry.166 Therefore, researchers would have to consider a similar
risk in cases of bioprospecting projects when setting term limits.
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A third analogy that could be used in setting terms for the
proposed bioprospecting right is the term used for data and
marketing exclusivity. Data exclusivity refers to the protection
extended to pre-clinical and clinical test data used in the drug
approval process from use by other firms applying for regulatory
approval.167 An additional exclusive right, market exclusivity, refers
to the exclusive right given to original manufacturers to market a
drug before competing generic versions are allowed to be
marketed.168 Both exclusive rights could work independently or
alongside patent rights, which means at its maximum the collective
exclusive right could be set at twenty years plus the period of data
and market exclusivity.
Data and marketing exclusivity terms differ depending on the
subject matter and the jurisdiction. For instance, the US Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) provides seven years of exclusivity to
Orphan Drugs (ODE) and five years for New Chemicals (NCE).169
In the European Union, the term has been harmonized (for
applications filed after November 2005) to eight years of data
exclusivity, plus a two-year general marketing exclusivity, and an
additional one year of marketing exclusivity if the medical product
has a “new indication.”170 Therefore, the term of exclusivity in the
EU can extend to eleven years from the initial marketing approval
by the original applicant.171 In Canada, the term is between six to
eight years depending on specific factors.172 Up to thirty-one years
of exclusivity can be acquired as the maximum term resulting from
the combination of twenty years of patent rights with up to eleven
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years of exclusivity (at least in the EU).173 In addition to these
general terms of exclusivity, there are also particular exceptions for
which shorter or longer terms of exclusivity are applied.
This brief survey of data and market exclusivity shows that what
policymakers believe to be optimal depends highly on the
jurisdiction and the subject matter involved. Although these terms
are related to bioprospecting because they deal with the drug
discovery process, data and market exclusivity become relevant in
later stages of the drug development process, whereas
bioprospecting happens in the early stages. Thus, the terms of
protections being provided for data and market exclusivity may not
be justified in the case of TMK used in bioprospecting. Furthermore,
the terms of data and market exclusivity may highly depend on the
lobbying power of special interest groups that successfully lobby
governments, which make existing terms less useful as a reference.
Despite these considerable shortcomings, these terms still provide
important reference points in the absence of data relating to the
average time that bioprospecting projects take to the point of
marketing a TK-based product or service.
While the above analysis points to a limited term of protection
for the proposed bioprospecting right, it is appropriate to engage
with the proposal for perpetual rights in TMK that some
stakeholders advance.174
b. Perpetual Bioprospecting Right?
Indigenous and local communities are heterogeneous and
therefore have different worldviews from each other. Some
communities may not recognize the concept of term limits on their
knowledge.175 This seems even more plausible given the fact that
TMK is usually considered to be an inherent part of the cultural and
environmental aspects of the community—it is even considered to
be part of the cultural identity of some communities. Therefore, the
idea of losing control over the knowledge following the expiration
173
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of a set term may be alien, and unattractive, to some.176 However,
losing control does not mean losing the ability to continue to use and
apply their knowledge; it only means that communities will not be
able to regulate the use of their knowledge by others. Even in this
sense, some communities still may not be enthusiastic in codifying
and disclosing their knowledge to outsiders who might use such
knowledge in ways that offend the community.
Proposals for perpetual intellectual property rights over knowhow are very rare. There does not seem to be any Western
jurisdiction with a perpetual patent system. Terms differ from one
community to another, but every jurisdiction seems to have term
limits. The U.S. Constitution goes to the extent of expressly calling
for term limits on such rights.177 The U.S. Constitution gives
Congress the power to enact legislation to “promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”178 It seems clear from such statements that term limits
are inherent in the American concept of patents. Other intellectual
property rights such as trademarks and the protection of secret
information do not have specified term limits.179 Such a right could
be considered perpetual so long as certain conditions continue to be
fulfilled.
For example, there have been calls for perpetual copyright.180
However, such proposals have been strongly criticized for
misunderstanding the nature of intellectual property rights.181 The
case for perpetual intellectual property rights is hard to make,
particularly in the case of patent rights. The scope of patents is
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generally broader than that of copyrights and thus, making a case for
perpetual claims to broad rights is unpersuasive.
As defined in this thesis, TMK is know-how and, as such,
resembles subject matter protected under patent laws. Because of
the above-described difference between the world views of
indigenous and local communities on the one hand and Western
perspectives on the other, a tension might arise when jurisdictions
set up the proposed bioprospecting rights regime. It will be a
challenge to show an economic efficiency rationale for a perpetual
bioprospecting right because presenting moral rights as analogous
to a right which at its core is an economic right would be flawed
reasoning. The analysis, instead, would benefit more from analogies
with other intellectual property concepts.
c. Analogy to Database Protection
It is plausible to provide renewed protection for new entries into
TMK databases. Such a system is all the more important given the
need to establish dynamic databases to reflect the dynamic nature of
TMK. One key precedent that knowledge-holder communities can
turn to is database protection. Separate protection for databases—or
a database right—is uncommon. Yet, making comparisons between
such systems and the proposed bioprospecting right may be fruitful
since TMK codification and disclosure would, in effect, mean the
establishment of a TMK database.
The European Union database directive is one of the more
popular systems of database protection.182 The core purpose of the
EU database directive is economic efficiency.183 It is intended to
correct the market failure that results from the non-excludable
nature of information goods documented in databases. 184 Article 10
of the directive sets fifteen years as the term limit for the protection
of databases.185 The directive goes further to state the following:
182

See Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the
Legal Protection of Databases, 1996 O.J. L. 77/20, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31996L0009:EN:HTML
(last visited Jul 2, 2015).
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Any substantial change, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, to the
contents of a database, including any substantial change resulting from
the accumulation of successive additions, deletions or alterations, which
would result in the database being considered to be a substantial new
investment, evaluated qualitatively or quantitatively, shall qualify the
database resulting from that investment for its own term of protection.186

Adding substantially new content to a database gives rise to a
new term of fifteen years for such databases.187 Therefore, a dynamic
database would provide continued protection for substantially
altered content. It is possible to apply such a practice to the proposed
sui generis TMK system. In these cases, continued protection for
dynamic TMK databases would be allowed so long as the
information is substantially altered.188 However, such an analogy
will only support continued protection for TMK databases to a
limited extent. Some TMK might not change significantly in such a
short period of time, and thus, it might not be considered
“substantially new.” Additionally, the protection of TMK should be
for the benefit of those who provide the information rather than for
the benefit of those who own or run the database. Consequently, the
benefits of comparing TMK databases to existing database
protection should be complemented by features that address the
differences between the two subject matters.
d. Analogy to “Domaine Public Payant”
The issue of “domaine public payant” or “a paying public
domain” is yet another existing system that scholars have
discussed.189 It bears some resemblance to the interest of some
knowledge holders for perpetual rights. The domaine public payant,
which mostly relates to copyright law, is a system in which users
pay for works that have already fallen into the public domain.190 In
1980, the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) conducted a survey of its member states
asking if they had a system resembling the domaine public payant
186
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in their jurisdictions and forty-six members responded.191 Of the
forty-six countries that responded, a minority (twelve countries)
confirmed that they had systems that resembled a paying public
domain.192 This obligation to pay for public domain material is a
perpetual obligation in almost all of these jurisdictions193 and takes
the form of a small percentage of the selling price of the product.194
It should be noted, however, that some jurisdictions have a short list
of the types of works covered under such system.195 The royalties
collected through such a system are either paid directly to
associations of authors of works or to the state which, in turn,
forwards at least some of the payment to such associations.196 The
application of a paying public domain to traditional knowledge197
that has already fallen into the public domain is supported by some
scholars and has already been adopted by some developing
countries.198
However, setting up a perpetual right for compensation from
know-how raises complex efficiency concerns. The move from
protecting expressions perpetually to protecting know-how
perpetually has its challenges. First, even if the precedent of a
perpetual “right” to compensation exists, it is known only in a
handful of jurisdictions,199 and the right relates only to
191
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expressions. 200 Secondly, rights over expression (such as copyrights)
are relatively shallow because there are alternative ways of
expressing the same idea. Patent rights are broad because acts of
infringement do not have to be exact imitations.201 Indeed, in the US
the doctrine of equivalents allows courts to decide that an act
substantially similar to the patented invention infringes if it does
“substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, to
yield substantially the same result.”202 Acts that are substantially
similar to those stated in the patent claim would be considered
infringements. Inventors who develop an invention independently
(without accessing a patented invention) and those who reverse
engineer products embodying an invention are still excluded from
receiving patent rights over the invention.203 The subject matter of
protection discussed in this article resembles those protected under
patent rights, not copyrights. Even if there is a precedent for granting
perpetual rights over expressions, extending such right to know-how
is quite different. Additionally, even if the lengthier term of
copyright protection (life plus 50 or 70 generally and 95–120 for
works for hire)204 exists, proposing such a term for the
bioprospecting right is unjustified because of the difference between
the two rights discussed above.
There is little literature that shows the efficiencies of adopting a
perpetual economic right over know-how.205 The risk of establishing
an inefficient system is even more pronounced when the right
granted is substantively broad. The broader the right, the shorter the
term should be. Given the fact that the right outlined in this section
is a substantive one, it should not be a perpetual right.
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One way to respond to this complex question in the context of
the bioprospecting right proposed earlier is to set up an inverse
relationship between the length and the breadth of the
bioprospecting right. The broader the right, the shorter its term
would be, and the narrower the right, the longer it would be. If such
a system is adopted, perpetual rights would be left only to the
narrowest bioprospecting rights. One may argue that perpetual
rights should only apply to “moral rights” in TMK, such as the right
to receive attribution. The longest any substantive right should last
is for the period the knowledge-holder community continues to
exist. A perpetual bioprospecting right over TMK is unwarranted in
the economic terms discussed in this article. The dynamic efficiency
gains would not be more than the static inefficiency gains if the right
is a perpetual right because the static inefficiency will continue to
increase while the dynamic efficiency gains will decrease over time.
e. Concluding Remarks on Term of Right
Economic literature would suggest that the longer the term of
bioprospecting right, the more codification and disclosure is
encouraged, but the more follow-on innovation is discouraged.206
However, this general principle is limited by the fact that after a
certain length, the incentivizing power of protection disappears
while the social cost of restricting access continues to increase.207
There is little agreement on what the optimal term of exclusive rights
over information goods should be. The right term would balance the
two interests in static and dynamic efficiency.208 Even if there were
no dynamic costs (i.e., negative effects on follow-on innovation),
the static costs, such as higher prices, might be greater than the
benefit if the right is perpetual.
It seems reasonable to provide protection that is longer than that
given to sub-patentable protection (i.e., seven to ten years), given
the limited standalone value and slow accretion rates for TMK. It
206
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also seems justifiable to provide protection for as long as the average
bioprospecting process takes. Although the average drug discovery
timeline with the use of TMK may be hard to estimate, the
aforementioned twelve- to fifteen-year estimated timeline for
general drug discovery could be used as a reference point.
Additionally, the diverse terms of protection provided for data and
market exclusivity should be factored in. In such analysis, it should
be noted that these terms of exclusivity may work independently of
or in conjunction with the exclusivity provided by patent rights. The
general terms of data and market exclusion range from three to ten
years.209
In terms of the range within which policymakers could fix term
limits, a minimal protection of twelve to fifteen years could be
adopted using the average time it takes to develop a drug. At a
maximum, any bioprospecting right adopted under such a system
should be tied to the continued existence of the knowledgeproviding community. As one scholar noted, “the duration of
protection [should be] linked to the subsistence of the conditions for
protection.”210 The proposals for perpetual bioprospecting rights
over TMK may not be justified when seen through an economic
efficiency lens. It may be justifiable to provide renewed terms of
protection for significantly new additions to the TMK database, as
is done in some existing database protection regimes. The scope of
protection under copyright is shallow compared to the proposed
bioprospecting right. Thus, it is not reasonable to compare the two
terms.
Because of the challenges in determining optimal terms, further
theoretical and empirical research into, among other things, the
average time it takes to produce TK-based products through
bioprospecting projects should be conducted in order to make an
informed decision. The core question in such inquiry should focus
on the implications of the different terms of protection in
encouraging the codification and disclosure of TMK, on the one
hand, and for follow-on innovation on the other.
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The term of the proposed bioprospecting right works in tandem
with other features of the system and its environment. Therefore, the
implications of the term of protection should be considered in the
larger context under which it operates. Perhaps different features,
such as the scope of the right and its value to society, could be
considered when deciding what term to adopt.
IV.
NATURE AND SCOPE OF CODIFICATION AND DISCLOSURE
Critics often focus on the nature and scope of TMK
codification.211 Some commentators argue that codification would
remove the knowledge from its environmental and cultural context,
thereby disrupting its original setting.212 However, such criticism
misses the fact that it is possible to provide cultural and
environmental context while codifying TMK. This criticism also
disregards the fact that knowledge can be codified without limiting
the ability of knowledge holding communities to continue using
their TMK in accordance with tradition. Because TMK faces an
alarming rate of loss, imperfect codification is preferred over
oblivion. In this spirit, the following section discusses the scope of
TMK codification.
A. Holistic Codification
Although the nature and scope of TMK codification could vary
according to the capacity and culture of knowledge-holder
communities, preferably codification should be holistic. An attempt
should be made to include cultural, environmental, and geographic
aspects of TMK when codifying the body of knowledge. In addition
to alleviating the concerns of critics of codification, such a holistic
approach may increase the value of the codification in other ways.
First, the cultural and environmental context in which TMK is found
may offer some valuable lessons for subsequent users. Since
bioprospecting involves significant unknown elements, the more
holistic a TMK codification is, the greater the chance that users will
211
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be able to develop successful drugs. Second, in addition to the value
of TMK codification for modern medicine, the codification might
have significant anthropological and historical value.
An important element in making TMK codification holistic is
the use of multi-disciplinary teams in the codification process. Such
teams should be made up of not only biomedical professionals but
also anthropologists, historians, archivists, and other social
scientists. Through such a system, knowledge codification could
have the supplementary value of preserving the culture and
environment through text. In addition to multi-disciplinary teams,
cutting-edge technological developments could be applied
whenever possible. For instance, audio-visual equipment could be
used to document not only the knowledge but also the setting in
which TMK is used. This could include having body cameras or
other recording devices on traditional healers or their assistants to
document the way they pick their resources, the way they deliver
treatments, etc. A concern that may arise here is that, in some
cultures, it may be offensive to use certain technologies. In such
situations, respect should be given to the customary rules and
practices so as not to alienate knowledge-holder communities.
It should, however, be noted that holistic codification does have
limitations. For instance, use of multi-disciplinary teams and
technology may increase the cost of documentation. In some cases,
this increased cost could be offset by the increased value (both
monetary and non-monetary) of holistic codification. However,
codification of the available resources and at whatever level of detail
is still more valuable than letting the knowledge disappear. Thus,
codification should be encouraged even if some communities or
countries may not succeed in making holistic codification. Since
TMK faces an alarming rate of loss, documenting as much
knowledge as possible as quickly as possible should be the goal.
Once codified, certain knowledge could be updated using dynamic
knowledge codification systems.
B. Scope of Codification
As a general principle, the preferred system of codification is a
broad one rather than narrow. While narrow TMK codification
would provide basic information, such as the name of the resource
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and its use, broad TMK codification would add details such as where
the plant resource is located, what time of the year it grows, and
what exact steps are used to extract the resources. It would also
include supporting documents collected or created by a multidisciplinary team made up of traditional healers, elders,
anthropologists, scientists, technology experts, etc. Technologies
related to knowledge codification, categorizations, geographical
location, and the like would be used to make the codification more
accessible, holistic, and dynamic. The broader the scope, the more
valuable the knowledge.
Here, it is instructive to revisit the hypothetical case of the Fan
people and their Goodya plant to explain what the different levels of
codification can look like. A narrow codification of the TMK related
to the Goodya plant would document the fact that the plant is used
by traditional healers to help people with depression. It might also
state the scientific name for Goodya, but that may be all the
information that a narrow codification provides.
On the other hand, a broad codification would attempt to codify
as much information as possible given available resources. For
instance, it could include the historical and cultural meaning Goodya
has for the Fan people. It would specify the location in which
Goodya grows, including GPS coordinates, the seasons in which it
grows, and describe the ceremony in detail. In addition to Goodya’s
traditional and scientific names, the system would include tags and
classifications in which the resource falls under. When possible, it
could detail the elements of the Goodya mixture.
In addition to such information, a broad codification could have
an audio-visual recording of the process of picking leaves and fruits
of the Goodya tree and the full ritual including the chanting and the
Hammer dance. The design of the clay pot, the face paintings, and
the “garment of wise men” used in the ritual would also be recorded
in detail. Broad codification should also include information on the
customary rules of the Fan people related to their knowledge of the
Goodya plant and their cultural expressions, such as the Hammer
dance and the chants. In general, a broad system of codification
should provide sufficient information to allow a user to not only
investigate the resource but also understand the context in which it
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is used. It should also make the knowledge accessible to both
knowledge-holder communities and users.
There are some TMK databases in different countries that could
be used as a guide in setting up TMK codification systems. New
databases can learn from existing databases and attempt to
overcome
their
existing
limitations
such
as
their
defensive/restrictive orientation, abiding by an international
standard system classification. Perhaps the most famous TMK
database is the Indian Traditional Knowledge Digital Library
(TKDL).213 The next section discusses a real example from a TMK
codification in the TKDL that was used in patent prosecution at the
Canadian Intellectual Property Office.
C. Example of Codified TMK: India’s TKDL
India’s TKDL has managed to codify more than 150 books of
Ayurveda, Unani, Siddha, and Yoga with close to three million
transcriptions.214 Although the amount of information included in
the database is impressive, it is currently only being used
defensively to invalidate non-inventive patents.215 A more proactive
use of the knowledge documented in the database would have
considerable global welfare-maximizing potential. The accessibility
of these three million transcripts to researchers can be expected to
result in increased efficiency in research and development of
biopharmaceutical products and services.216
One sample of the information documented in the TKDL might
help explain what a broad TMK codification should look like. The
213
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TMK in question was used to challenge patent application number
CA-02642184 for a “composition containing ginseng and
cinnamon” by Goliath Oil and Gas Corporation.217 Dr. V.K. Gupta,
the director of the TKDL, filed several transcriptions from the
database under Section 34.1 of the Patent Act, and the submissions
were used to challenge the patent.218 One of the key transcriptions is
reproduced verbatim below to help with the discussion.
Title of Traditional Knowledge Resource: Khamira Sandal Alvi
Khani
Knowledge Known Since: 100 Years
TKRC CODE: AO1A-1/1331, AO1A-1/1347, AO1A-1/1654,
AO1A-1/1720 [ . . . ]
IPRC Code: A61K 133/00, A61K 35/64, A61K 36/185, A61K
36/30 [ . . . ]
DETAILS OF PROCESS/FORMULATION:
1. Khamira Sandal Alvi Khani is a therapeutic single/compound
formulation consisting of useful parts of following ingredients(s):
Santalum album Linn. (sandalwood), Silk Coccon, Onosma
bracteatum, Rosa damascene Mill. (pink rose, Rose), Nymphaea
alba Linn. (European white water-lily, Water Lily), Cinnamomum
zeylancicum Blume (cinnamon), Crocus sativus Linn. (saffron
crocus, saffron), Granular sugar
2. Therapeutic composition/formulation is mentioned below:
1 santalum album Linn. (sandalwood)
9 gm
2 Silk Cocoon
- -shredded 9 mg
3 Onosma bracteatum
Flower
12 gm

217

Patent 2667831 Summary, CANADIAN INTELL. PROP. OFF.,
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4 Rosa damascene Mill. (pink rose, Rose)
Flower
12 numbers
5. Nymphaea alba Linn. (European white water-lilly, Water
Lily) Flower
24 gm
6 Cinnamomum zeylanicum Blume (cinnamon)
Stem bark
2 gm
7 Crocus sativus Linn. (saffron crocus, Saffron)
Stigma
2 gm
8. Granular sugar
210 gm
3. Therapeutic composition mentioned above is prepared as
KHAMIRA: It is a semisolid preparation in which a decoction of
certain drugs is prepared, [;] sugar is added to make a base
(qiwam). Drugs of animal/mineral origin mentioned in the
formulation are powdered and added at this time. It is then shaken
vigorously with a DABI till [it] becomes white. In the end,
silver/gold foil is added.
4. A composition as described above is formulated as
Honey/Sugar based Semisolid preparation.
5. The dose of [the] above mentioned therapeutic composition is
9 gm.219
While the last communications on file show that the patent is in
a “state of abandonment,”220 the official administrative status shows
it is a “dead application.”221
The TKDL seems to be somewhere in the spectrum halfway
between narrow and broad codification of TMK. It describes the
resources used and the knowledge of their use. However, the
knowledge codified is very narrow because it does not provide much
219
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information about the people from whom the knowledge originates.
There are positive lessons that can be taken for use by TMK
databases that will be organized in the future. There are also
limitations that should be addressed.
One of the major achievements of the TKDL is its creation of
the Traditional Knowledge Resource Classification (TKRC). The
TKRC, which imitated the International Patent Classification
(IPC),222 was developed in response to the lack of organization in
documenting Indian TK. As can be seen in the example above, the
database references both the TKRC and the IPC in each
transcription. This database will be highly useful for users and
knowledge-holder communities to easily locate the resources. Other
initiatives codifying TMK should consider developing their own
methods of classification as the TKRC seems custom made for
Indian TMK. However, such initiatives could still borrow many
features of the TKRC in their own categorizations. If the database
begins being used in the proactive sense to help researchers discover
drugs more quickly, the TKRC will have the added value of
collecting related knowledge about a specific disease. In addition to
disclosing TMK, the TKRC will make it much easier for researchers
to locate the TMK and the specific health issues it has been used to
address.
The other major lesson that could be taken from the TKDL is
that, despite the fact that the database is available under restrictive
licenses for the sole purpose of patent examination, efforts have
been made to make the database more accessible, such as digitizing
the database and translating the contents to several global
languages.223 The content of the database has been translated into six
languages: English, French, Spanish, German, Japanese and
Hindi.224 The fact that the information is documented in a way that
enables digital searches is an important element in its accessibility.
The transcription of TMK in scientific terminologies and
standardized measurement further adds to its accessibility.
222
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Moreover, the codification specifies the types and quantities of
ingredients used in creating the mixture of plant resources with brief
instruction on how to produce them.225 This is valuable as it allows
users to successfully replicate the traditional ways of producing the
mixture, which is one of the first challenges in bioprospecting
projects.226
The TKDL has some limitations that future initiatives to codify
TMK should attempt to minimize. A core limitation is that the
database does not take a holistic approach in the way previously
proposed. The information documented in the TKDL outlines only
the types and amount of ingredients used in a resource for TMK in
recipe format.227 It disregards the cultural, historical, environmental,
and geographic information that could be documented together with
the knowledge.228 As stated above, the value of codified TMK
increases with its breadth.229 Since bioprospecting inherently
involves unknown features of the knowledge and resource, the
broader a codification, the greater its ability to help direct
researchers. Additionally, the documentation of the cultural,
environmental, and geographic context in which the knowledge has
existed will promote other initiatives such as cultural and
environmental preservation.
The other major limitation of the TKDL is that it is currently
only being used defensively to help invalidate non-inventive patent
applications or to limit the scope of patent claims.230 Access is
225
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granted to patent examiners through restrictive non-disclosure
agreements called “access agreements” signed between the Council
of Scientific and Industrial Research (India) and the accessing patent
offices.231 India has entered into access agreements with the
European Patent Organization (EPO), the German Patent and
Trademark Office (DPMA), the United States Patent and
Trademarks Office (USPTO), the United Kingdom Intellectual
Property Office (IPO), the Canadian Intellectual Property Office
(CIPO),232 Intellectual Property Australia (IP Australia), the
Japanese Patent Office (JPO), the Indian Patent Office (CGPDTM),
and the Chilean Patent Office (INAPI).233 There are slight
differences in the restrictiveness of each access agreement.234 For
instance, the first access agreement signed with the European Patent
Organization states under the relevant parts that:
Responsibilities and Obligations of User
(i) The User shall not disclose any information of TKDL contents to
third parties unless it is necessary for the purposes of the European patent
grant procedure in all its phases, including the inspection of files. To this
end, the User may, whenever required, deliver information from TKDL
contents in whatever form to the patent applicant for the purpose of
231
See Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) Access Agreement
between the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (India) and the
European Patent Organization, the Japanese Patent Office and the United States
Patents and Trademarks Office (on file with author).
232
TKDL materials that have been used in patent examination are accessible on
the website of the government operated patent search engine. The TKDL licenses
state that patent offices may disclose content to third parties “only to the extent
that it is necessary for patent search and examination.” This phrase seems to allow
disclosure only to patent examiners and parties involved in the patent examination
process. However, considering the practice of Western jurisdictions in publishing
of patent examination material in publicly accessible repositories, the disclosure
of TKDL material used in the rejection of patent application to the general public
may still be in accordance with the TKDL licenses. Traditional Knowledge
Digital Library (TKDL) Access Agreement (with the United States Patent and
Trademark Office) art. 2 (1) - Responsibilities and Obligations of USPTO.
233
Major Milestones, TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE DIGITAL LIBRARY (TKDL),
http://www.tkdl.res.in/tkdl/langdefault/Common/AboutTKDL.asp?GL=#History
(last visited Nov. 5, 2017).
234
Compare the wordings of the following agreements between the Indian
Governments and the patent offices of the US, EU, and Japan TKDL Access
Agreement, supra note 86.
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citations. Except as mentioned above, the User undertakes to preserve
the secrecy and/or confidentiality of the information.
(ii) The User shall use TKDL information only for the purposes of the
European patent grant procedure in all its phases including the inspection
of files and for no other purpose.
(iii) The User shall on a quarterly basis send the number of times content
of TKDL was cited by the User’s examiners during the search process
relating to published patent applications.
(iv) Survival of obligations for maintaining the secrecy and
confidentiality of TKDL shall remain even after the termination of this
Agreement.235

The access agreement with the USPTO is slightly more generous
in that it allows the USPTO to “publicly post the search result on the
USPTO’s Patent Application Information Retrieval System and on
other search and examination results digital access systems.”236 This
phrase has allowed the USPTO to post the contents of TKDL
documentations used in patent prosecution in the US in a publicly
accessible manner.237 Despite these differences in restriction, the
TKDL’s orientation is defensive, and it has a goal of invalidating or
limiting non-inventive patent applications.238 The restrictiveness of
the database is understandable given the lack of legal protection that
encourages proactive use. However, the current state of affairs
misses the considerable welfare-enhancing potential that a positive
use of databases such as the TKDL might bring about. Once there is
a satisfactory legal regime that extends legal protection to codified
TMK, such databases should be oriented towards positive uses of
the knowledge documented in them.

235

Traditional Knowledge Digital Library (TKDL) Access Agreement, Eur.India, 2 (i-iv) (on file with author).
236
Id.
237
Composition for the Treatment of Diabetes Mellitus and Metabolic
Syndrome, USPTO (July 8, 2010), http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nphParser?Sect1=PTO1&Sect2=HITOFF&d=PG01&p=1&u=/netahtml/PTO/srchnu
m.html&r=1&f=G&l=50&s1=20100173022.PGNR.
238
TKDL, supra note 42.
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V.

IMPLICATIONS OF DISCLOSURE FOR SUBSEQUENT PATENT
APPLICATIONS
In many jurisdictions, if inventors (or individuals who receive
knowledge from inventors) disclose an invention to the public
before filing a patent, they risk having their patent application
rejected for lack of novelty (newness).239 The disclosure of the
invention, even if made by the inventors, would put the invention in
the prior art category, barring it from patentability.240 Some
jurisdictions recognize grace periods in which inventors are given a
limited amount of time after the disclosure of the invention to apply
for a patent.241 A grace period gives an inventor a certain amount of
time (usually between six to twelve months)242 from the time of the
first disclosure of the invention to apply for a patent without
affecting the novelty of the disclosed invention.
Given the above-described feature of patent law, a key issue that
would arise in the implementation of the proposed bioprospecting
rights is the implications of codifying and disclosing TMK for
subsequent patent applications by the TK holders.243 In other words,
should the TMK codified and disclosed by the applicant be used as
prior art against the applicant (TK holder) in a later patent
application by the TK holder or would the prior registration give the
applicant the privilege of overcoming the novelty and nonobviousness analysis? This is an important question because if TMK
codification could subsequently be used against the applicant in a
patent prosecution, it could disincentivize TK holders from TK
codification and disclosure. Applicants would, in effect, be
submitting evidence that could be used against themselves in their
future patent applications. Therefore, the capacity of the proposed
239

35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
Id.
241
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2012); Canadian Patent Act (R.S.C., 1985,
C. P-4), §§ 28.2(1)(a), 28.2(1)(a), 28.3.
242
Both the US and Canada provide a one year grace period. See Canadian
Patent Act (R.S.C., 1985, C. P-4), §§ 28.2(1)(a), Paragraphs 28.2(1)(a), 28.3,
http://www.laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/P-4/; 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)(1) (2012).
243
It should be noted that other applicants would be barred from using the
codified TMK and therefore would not be able to apply for a patent on an
improvement on the codified TMK until the term of the bioprospecting right
lapses.
240
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sui generis system to encourage the codification and disclosure of
TMK by private actors depends heavily on what the effects of
disclosure on potential exclusive rights would be.
There are policy alternatives that could adopt a narrow or broad
right. A system that prefers a narrow right would adopt the position
that any disclosure will be used against the applicant as a prior art
reference in a subsequent patent application. Here, the applicant
would still have a head start or lead time to apply for a patent for an
invention based on TMK because of the initial exclusive right the
applicant would have been granted. It may be that such lead time is
sufficient to encourage TK holders to invest in codifying and
disclosing TMK. However, since the lead time would probably be
an insufficient incentive, adopting a narrow right might have the
effect of reducing the impact of the sui generis right.
The other extreme is to take the position that the disclosure of
TMK in a sui generis system would not have any detrimental effect
on a subsequent patent application by the same applicant. Adopting
such a broad right could be expected to send a strong incentivizing
signal to applicants interested in codifying TMK. If the policy
priority is to encourage the codification and disclosure of TMK, then
granting broader rights could be expected to have a greater capacity
for encouraging disclosure than a system in which the applicant
would be submitting evidence that could prevent a subsequent
patent application. The second system is advocated in this article.
Since investments in the documentation and disclosure of TMK are
expected to have significant risks, policy makers may need to
provide a strong signal to TK-holder communities and licensees to
invest in codification and disclosure, thus saving the body of
knowledge from loss.
It is worth mentioning that there are various points across this
policy spectrum, any one of which could be adapted to reflect the
particular policy objective of the country adopting the system. It
should also be noted that the proposed sui generis system does not
operate in a legal vacuum; the incentivizing effect of the proposed
system depends on other legal and regulatory features of the country
in question.
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VI.
BUILDING STAKEHOLDER BUY-IN
Another important challenge the proposed system will face is
convincing the various stakeholders to agree to the framework. First,
the proposed system must earn the source community’s trust.
Second, it must build confidence among bioprospectors to invest in
the codification, disclosure, and use of TMK. And lastly, it must
convince governments to establish the legal framework and support
codification.
In many countries around the world, indigenous and local
communities have been, and in many cases continue to be,
oppressed culturally, politically, and economically.244 Past
experiences have forced many communities to be suspicious of
outsiders, often for good reason. The success of the proposed sui
generis system of TMK protection depends on the extent to which
this distrust between knowledge-holder communities and outsiders
can be overcome. To establish trust, the framework of TMK
protection should enable communities to take center stage in the
creation of the framework and other major steps along the way. If
the framework successfully empowers knowledge-holder
communities, they would be motivated to codify and disclose their
knowledge. Making communities equal players in establishing the
framework will help in the trust building process.
One way to empower knowledge-holder communities is to give
them effective decision-making power regarding what happens once
their knowledge is codified and disclosed. Under a property rights
rule, knowledge-holder communities would be able to give or refuse
consent or to put conditions on access to the knowledge. Each
community may have its own interests that cannot be readily
included in any legislation. Thus, one way to make sure that these
interests are addressed is to allow communities to refuse consent if
they find a proposed licensing agreement to be insufficient. Terms
and conditions of a licensing agreement can include economic and
non-economic benefits or obligations. While communities that seek
244

State of the World’s Indigenous Peoples, U.N. ECON. & SOC. AFF. (2009),
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/SOWIP/en/SOWIP_web.pdf;
see also M. Annette Jaimes, THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA : GENOCIDE,
COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE (RACE & RESISTANCE SERIES) (1992).

DEC. 2017]

Intellectual Property and Bioprospecting

333

to receive benefits from their knowledge could do so, those that
prefer to give it away freely may choose not to exercise their rights.
Giving communities the power to set terms and conditions of access
would convince communities that have non-economic interests or
values to buy into the system.
Bioprospectors are another important stakeholder group. Since
some (if not most) knowledge-holder communities will not be able
to finance the codification and disclosure of TMK, they would need
partners who can support them in such an endeavor. The support of
the private sector is essential to complement government support,
especially in cases where government support is largely lacking.
Bioprospectors would be encouraged to partner with knowledgeholder communities through the incentive of a bioprospecting right
they could benefit from once they enter into an agreement with the
source community. Additionally, since the confusing state of affairs
relating to liabilities for the use of TMK in bioprospecting projects
raises the transaction costs involved, a clear framework that sets out
the obligation of stakeholders will benefit users as well. The
combination of these incentives would encourage bioprospectors to
buy into the proposed system.
A central issue for users is why user-countries would agree to
set up a legal framework that would further restrict the ability of
persons within their jurisdiction to access TMK. The troubling
protectionist trend in which TK holders are increasingly becoming
restrictive in terms of granting access to their knowledge may be
what encourages user-countries to buy into the framework. The
current practice of gaining access to TMK without sharing any
benefits with the knowledge providing communities does not seem
to be sustainable in the long term. Provider countries and
communities have already started restricting access to their
knowledge because of the lack of protection.245 The protectionist
trend (and the potential for increasing restrictions on access to
TMK) should encourage users—and, more importantly, their
245

Carvalho, supra note 33, at 245–47 (stating that indigenous and local
communities are becoming secretive and listing national attempts to restrict
access to TK); Cottier & Panizzon, supra note 4, at 757–65 (outlining national
legislations enacted to protect TK in India, Brazil, Peru, The Philippines, and the
Africa model legislation).
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governments—to agree to shift to a system that rewards knowledge
holders.
Even if users could evade these restrictions and access TMK, it
might increase the cost of future access to the knowledge since
knowledge holders will try to further restrict access. On the other
hand, providing clear and effective rights to TMK would facilitate
access to it, thereby reducing costs associated with using TMK.
Here, a race for access might encourage user country governments
to compete in setting up such systems with the goal of receiving
preferred access to TMK. In conclusion, the proposed system might
attract user countries because it would facilitate the use of TMK by
individuals, institutions, and businesses in their jurisdictions. It is
also the more feasible route for the long-term access to TMK.
VII. CONCLUSION
After providing some introductory concepts about TK, this
article situated TK in the public goods literature. Doing so allowed
for the established economic concepts regarding public goods to be
applied in examining alternative governance frameworks for TK.
This article assessed the potential benefits and limitations of four of
the common channels used in supporting investments in the
production of knowledge goods in general in the context of TK.
Each alternative framework has advantages and disadvantages, and
a combination of these channels seems to be the more suitable
approach for addressing the complex interests and scenarios present
in the attempt to encourage investment in TK codification and
disclosure.
In the case of “modern” knowledge, the recognition of private
rights plays a key role in encouraging investments in knowledge
generation and distribution. Following from this understanding, the
recognition of private rights as an alternative legal framework for
TMK codification and disclosure is outlined. It outlines the features
of a bioprospecting right that balances the interests of the
stakeholders involved. The bioprospecting right is a cluster of rights
emanating from bioprospecting activity based on TMK. The right
will be granted to source communities that codify their TMK either
in publicly accessible databases or in restricted databases to which
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a government agency or other entity would have access. The article
discussed two alternative rights for TMK codified in a publicly
accessible database, each with advantages and disadvantages. The
first alternative is the granting of an exclusive right to conduct
bioprospecting activities. This option grants a powerful right to
source communities with the power to veto any bioprospecting
projects based on the codified TMK. While such a strong right
would encourage investments in the codification and disclosure of
TMK, it involves a risk because it may encourage source
communities to over claim. The second alternative is the recognition
of a right to share benefits from bioprospecting projects conducted
by others. This second alternative, which only grants rights to share
profits, involves lesser incentives to over claim and may encourage
users to engage in bioprospecting projects with fewer transaction
costs. While policy makers are encouraged to adopt a suitable
framework for their jurisdiction, the second framework is preferred
in this article. The transaction cost of using TMK in bioprospecting
projects is lower in the second alternative since users are not
required to negotiate with source communities ex ante, while source
communities would still be able to share from the resulting profits.
To benefit from the bioprospecting right, applicants have to
fulfill four core requirements: that the applicant either be the
knowledge-holder community or a licensee of such community; that
licensees sign an equitable benefit-sharing agreement with the
knowledge-holder community; that the applicant clearly describes
the knowledge being claimed; and that the knowledge should not be
widely diffused.
While a specific term of these rights has not been provided, this
article examined the key factors that policy makers should consider
in designing the scope of the right. These include existing terms for
intellectual property rights, database protection, and domaine public
payant. Furthermore, the article also provided a hypothetical and
actual example of TMK codification to help policy makers craft an
appropriate protection regime. The establishment of a holistic
codification that includes the details of TMK and its socio-cultural
environment should be encouraged. The article concludes by
examining the implications of TK codification and disclosure on
subsequent patent applications and ways in which the
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bioprospecting right could build the interests of diverse
stakeholders.
A carefully crafted bioprospecting right will facilitate
partnerships between source communities and users, thereby
creating a more efficient and sustainable bioprospecting industry.
Furthermore, the legal framework has the potential to save
considerable TMK from loss through codification and disclosure.
As a result, there are strong welfare-enhancing outcomes that can be
expected from the establishment of an effective system of protection
for TMK.

